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FROM THE I.AW AND EQUITY COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND, 
"The briefs shall be printed in type not less in size than 
small pica, and shall be nine inches in length and six inches 
in width, so as to conform in dim(lnsions to the printed 
records along with which they are to be bound, in accord-
ance with Act of Assembly, approved March 1, 1903; and 
the clerks of this court are directed not to receive or file a 
brief not conforming in an respects to the aforementioned 
requirements." 
The foregoing is printed in small pica type for the infor-
mation of counsel. 
H. STEW ART JONES, Clerk. 
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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
AMANDA A. JACKSON 
vs. 
CITY OF RICMOND. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND ST!PERSEDEAS 
To the Honm·able Judges of the Sup1·en~e Co1trt of Appeals: 
Your petitioner, Amanda A. Jackson, represents that she 
is aggrieved by a final judgment of the Law Rnd Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, Virginia, rendered in the above en-
titled case on July 28th, 1927, sustaining defendant's plea of 
the Statute of Limitations to, and dismissing the suit and· 
entering judgment for costs against your petitioner. A tran-
- script of the record of said action is filed herewith as a part 
of this petition frorp which it appears that your Honorable 
Court has jurisdiction. 
STATE~fENT. 
Your petitioner represented that the City of Richmond 
was on and before April 23rd, 1926, a: municipal corporation 
and that it negligently and carelessly permitted and allowed 
the sidewalk on the south side of Leigh Street between 22nd 
and 23rd Streets to become uneven and the bricks to become 
loose and scattered about thereon and to be in a dangerous, 
defective and unsafe condition for use by your petitioner 
and other pedestrians; that your petitioner while walking 
thereon during the night time and while exercising ordinary 
care, came in contact with said loose and uneven bricks and 
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defective and dangerous place in the said sjdewalk and was 
thereby caused to fall with great force upon said sidewalk, 
breaking her ieft elibow, left hip, injur~ her ankle and 
othe:rwis.e ,woundiug., ·bruisiD;g and permanently dh::ab[in,g her, 
etc. 
The injury occurred .on April 25th, 1923. On April 28th, 
1923, B. A. Jackson, son of your petitioner and who was act-
ing as her agent, filed with the City Attorney, a letter in which 
he said: 
''Please accept this as 1~otice of in.itttry anrl da11nage to the 
person of A1nanda A. Jackson * * * who met with a serious 
accident along with certain damages on the vight of W ednes-
day 25th day of April, 1923, between the howt's of 9 A. l.J!l. and 
.10 P. M. and at or near {lt'nd between 2f2nd and 2/Jrd Streets on 
Lei,qh on the south sidewalk and .in or abou,f the 1niddle of 
the city block.'' 
"To the best of my information from the lJospital authori-
ties (Retreat for the Sick) she has a broken arm, hip hone 
hroken and considerably bruised.'' (R., 30.) 
This notice was verified by the oath of B. A. Jackson, the 
son and agent of your petitioner. The City Attorney did not 
reply to or refuse to "accept this as notice" of the nature of 
the claim and of the ti·me and place of the injury. 
On ~Iay 31st, 1923, your petitioner's attorneys wrote the 
·Oity Attorney a letter for her (R., 31-32), jn which, among 
other things, they stated that your petitioner had employed 
them * • * 
"tQ repr~sent her in the collection of a claim against the city 
for damages resulting from a fall caused by loose bricks and 
broken and uneven pavement on the south side of Leigh 
Street between 22nd and 23rd 8treets on the night of April 
·25th, 1923, * * * and that she fell by reason of the dangerous 
and unsafe condition of the pavement a1~d broke her left elbow 
and left hip bone and injured her arm and sustained other 
bruises, injuries and wounds. We are advised that report ~vas 
·made of this O'lain~ to the city by Mr. I-li1·shber_q and we as-
su'lne that JJO'U are fan~iliar with the fact. 
We are writing you direct about the matter, as we know 
this claim will be referred to you and we sl1a1l be pleased to 
have you advise as what settlement, if any, the city will make. 
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we will be pleased to confer with you .a·bout the .ta;c:ts if you 
desire us to do -so. ' ' 
The defendant, through its City Attorney, on June 20, 1923, 
aekn0wledged re'ceipt of this letter (R . ., 32). 
Your petitioner brought tl1is actioll to First September 
Rules, 1923, and on Septembet 17th, 1923, delivered to the · 
City Attorney an exact copy of the orignal d·eclaration filed~·.1)'' 
· in this action (R., 32); and, o~ S'eptember .25, 1'923, also :fil~ 
with the City Attorney an additional written statement veri:.· 
rfied by the oath of the complainant of the nature of her claim 
and of the time and place at which the injury is alleged to· 
have ·occurred or been received. (H .. , 32-33.) 
Your petitioner represents that eanh of thn aforesaid veri-
fied written statements, the one dated April 28th, 1923, and 
the other dated :September 17, 1923, and the abcve letter dated 
l\iay 31, 1923, as ·well as the copy of .the d-eclaration, were·each 
·and all filed uith the City Attorney withiilt .~x months from 
the ti1ne when her cattse of action accrued, and each referred 
to the same cause of action, injury and time and plac.e; and 
were supplemental to each other. The City of Richmonq 
immediately after its receipt of the written statement of 
April 2R, 1923, acted upon said written statements and "in· 
vest.igated the nature of the claim and the time and place at 
which the injury occurred'', and did this long· before six 
months from the time the cause of action accrued, a11d be'" 
fore the institution of this action to First September Rules, 
1923. It did not ref-ztse to accept the above written statentent 
of April 28, .1923, as notice or qu,estion the .~ffficiency of the 
abm.'e ~vritten state1nent at o;ny time w·ithin said s·ix months 
'Period. It never appeared until on December 10, 19232 and then it flied a statement in writin~q of its defPnse in wh1ch it 
did not deny the dangerous and unsafe condition of its side"' 
walks, nor did it then question the sufficiency of any of the 
above written statements and notices, bnt it then alleged 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff as its sole defense to 
·this action. See grounds of defense (R., p. 31). It was not 
until on February 22nd, 1927, nearly four years after the 
date of the plaintiff's injury, and the above notices, and ovet 
three years after tl1e city had filed its above sole defense, 
that the defendant .filed its demurrer to the delaration on the 
ground that the declaration failed to alle,qf. that a written 
statement verified by the oath of the plaintiff, her agent or 
attorney, of the natu.re of the clari1n a.nd of the. time and pla.ce 
at which the injury occurred, had been filed with the City A.t-
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torney within six months after the alleged cause of action 
aecrued. Thereupon your petitioner, by leave of court, 
amended her declaration by inserting and nlleging therein: 
* * * "that she had filed with the City Atton1ey within six 
months after the aforesaid cause of action accrued to her, 
written statements verified :J:>y her and her agen~ and attor-
ney, of the nature of her claim and of the time and place at 
'vhich the injury is alleged to have occurred or been received 
and sustained by her by reason of. the aforesaid negligence of . 
the City of Richmond." (R., 6.) 
·The defendant then filed its demurrer to the declaration 
as amended, in which demurrer the plaintiff joined and the 
,cou,rt overruled the dem1-tr·re1· to the .A.1ne11rled Declaration. 
(R .. , 6.) 
The defendant then :filed two written pleas (R., 8-13), and 
the plaintiff filed her written motion to reject, strike out and 
dismiss these two pleas (R., 13), and also filed her written 
demurrer to them (R., 14-15), which motion and demurrer the 
court overruled and the plaintiff. excepted (R., 6). On April 
8, 1923, your petitioner filed her replications (R., 16-27), to 
the defendant's above two pleas. 
On June 1st, 1927, the defendant filed its demurrer (R., 21-
22), in 'vritng to the plaintiff's above repli~ations and also 
:r;noved to dismiss them ( R .. , 22-23). On J nne 4th, 1927, the 
defendant also filed a written plea of the Statute of ~imita­
tions to the Amended Declaration (R., 25). 
Thereupon the court filed a written opinion (R., 26-29), in 
which it overruled defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's 
above replications and in doing so, among other things, said: 
"By the order entered on the 22nd day of Feb 'y, 1927, the 
court allowed the plaintiff to amend her declaration by in-
serting a general allegation that notice had been given to 
the City Attorney in conformity with the charter provision 
whereupon the defendant demurred to the declaration as 
amended, and the court overruled the demurrer; the defend-
ant then filed hvo spcial pleas in .writing, and the plaintiff 
;first moved the court to strike out the two pleas, and then 
demurred to them, both of which positions of the plaintiff 
were denied or overruled. 
Since that time the plaintiff has filed written replications 
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to each of the pleas, and the defendant has filed a motion to 
reject and strike out the replications, and likewise a demu-rrer 
to them. · 
The questions arising upon the motion to strike out, and 
upon the demurrer to the pleas, have been argued before 
me this June 4th, 1~27.· 
There are three cases so far in Virginia relative to the 
notice of the claim to be given to a municipal corporation in 
negligence cases. They are: O'Neil vs. City of Richrnond, 141 
Va. 168; Bowles vs. City of Richmond, 133 S. E. 593, and City 
of. P01·tsmo1dh vs. lVeiss, 135 Va. 94. I gP..ther from these 
~cases that the notice or statement filed within the prescribed 
period is in the nature of a condition preceilent to the main-
tenance of the action, and therefore an omission to allege in 
the plaintiff's pleading that the la'v had been complied with 
in this respect renders the pleading subject to demurrer. The 
OM1SSTON TO SO ALLEGE IN THE DECLARATION 
OR ~lOTION IN TI-IIS CASE· HAS BEEN CUR.ED BY AN 
A.IVIENDMENT V\THICH THE COUH.T PROPERL·Y AL-
LOWED. The a·mend·ment, which 1nerely alleges in general 
ter-ms compliance w·ith the charter req't6·ire·ment, does not of 
itself change the cause of action nor m.ake a new case; it 
merely supplies one of the omitted requisites connected with 
but essential to the plaintiff's case, which should have been 
averred in the orignal declaration." 
' Thereafter, on July 28, 1927, your petitioner, the plaintiff, 
filed a written repliec'ltion to defendant's pleas of the Statute 
of Limitation and the defendant demurred (I{., 35), to plain-
tiff's replication. T~1ereupon the Court 1·eversed its above 
ruling a.nd opinion and sustained the defendant's demurrer 
to plaintiff's retJlication, to the plea of the 8tat'll.te of Li1ni-
tation arnd held that the above arnendntent to plaintiff's 
declaration alleged a ne'w caqt,se of action f1·orn that set out 
in the original declat·ation and that the plaintiff's right of ac-
tion was therefore barred by the Statute of Limitations and 
dismissed this action and entered judgment for the defend-
ant against the plaintiff for .costs. To 'vhich ruling and judg-
ment of the trial court the plaintiff excepted (R .. , 38, Bill of 
Exceptions, R., 40). 
ASSIGN].fEN'I'S OF ERROR. 
Your petitioner represents that the trial court erred in 
sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's Repli-
cation to defendant's plea of the Statute o.f Limitations and 
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in holding that the amendment to plaintiff's Declaration made 
a new cause of action from that set forth in the original 
declaration and that your petitioner's right of action was 
barred by the Statute and in dismissing this action and en-
tering judgment against your petitioner for ~osts. (R., 37.) 
'l1he trial Court in sustaining the defendant's demurrer to 
the plea of S'tatute of Limitations, among other things, said: 
"The plaintiff had no right of action ttntil she gave notice; 
the notice having been given after the suit ·was brought and 
declaration filed, she could only be in position to insist upon 
her right to maintain a suit upon her cah~P. of action from 
the time she files an amended declaration bringing in the 
notice required by the statute, unless she lets her original 
declaration be dismissed on demurrer, or takes a non-suit 
upon the trial, and then brings a new actiou. 
The antended declaraiton 1nay n.ot allege a technically new 
catt.se of action, but it is based essentially 'Upon a new clain~ 
or demand withottt which ·no ri._qht of action against the de-
fendant existed upon the record at any time.'' 
ARGU1\IENT. 
The trial court in its opinion in commenting upon this 
holding said: (R., 37.) 
"The effect of an a1nended declara.tion ,Jf this charactm~ 
has not been before the Co·urt in Virginia." 
Your petitioner is advised that this is true for obvious 
reason that no court in Virginia has ever before given the 
effect to an amendment of this character to a declaration 
as that last given by the learned trial eourt to the amend-
ment in this case, and when the defendant demurred to the 
plaintiff's amended declaration and replication, and raised 
the same question on Febn1ary 22nd, 1927, the learned trial 
.court itself gav-e an entirely different and ,,pposite elf ect to 
that later given atnd he1~eiJn, oo'inplained of 'when it sustained 
defendant's plea of the Stattde of Lim-itations. See trial 
court's opinion, R-., bottom 26, top 27, where the court, among 
other things, held in overruling defendant's demurrer: 
''The amendment, which nwrely alle_qes hz ,qeneral term,s 
compliooce with the charter rcqu,ire1nent, ·'loes not of itself 
ch(Jifl,ge the cOfU.Se of action nor n~ake a new case; it 1nm·ely 
supplies one of the adntitted requisites connected with but 
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essential .to the plaintiff's case which should have been 
averred to the original declaration.'' 
.Section 19 G of the ·City Charter was enaeted on 19 .... , 
and reads as follows : 
''No action shall be maintained against the said city for 
damages for an injury to any person or property alleged to 
have been sustained by reason of the negligence of the cit) 
or of any officer, agent or employee thereof, unless .a written 
statement, verified by the oath of the claimant, his age.nt 'or 
attorney, of the nature of the claim and of the time and place 
at which the injury is alleged to have occurred or been re-
ceived, shall have been :filed with the city attorney of said 
tcity 'vithin six months after such cause of action shall have 
accrued.'' 
Your petitioner represents that this Section does not make 
the verified written statement required to be given by it to 
the City .Attorney, the cause of action, or any part thereof. It 
does not create the cause of action, nor is such written state-
ment any part of the injured person's cause of action. The 
cause of action must have arisen, must have aecrued to the 
injured person before the ·written notice of the nature of his 
claim and of the time and place can be given. For if no cause 
of action has arisen, or accrued, no written statement of the 
nature of the claim and of the time and place at which the 
injury occurred can be given. 1'he section itself expressly, 
allows the wr·itten staternent to be given it f!ny time "withi1~ 
six 'months after S'lteh cause of action shall have accrued". 
The uwitten statemen.t and the C(ltztse of aation, thus treated 
and spoken of in Section 19G as two 'wholly .c;epa.rate and dis-
tinct things. Under the general law, an injured person has 
twelve months after his cause of action has arisen or accrued 
in which to institute his suit therefor against the person 
whose negligence causes such injury, and the injured person 
can sue immediately after the injury occurs, or the cause of 
action accrued to him. Section 19G of the City Charter was 
not enacted for the purpose of depriving th.e injured person 
of his right to sue immediately or at any time within the 12 
months after accrual of his cause of action, provided he gives 
the "'vritten statement" within six months. 
The object and purpose of Section 19G of tl1e City Charter 
was not to make the written statement a part of the injured 
person's cause of action nor to prevent him from instituting 
his action, any time within the 12 months but was, as declared 
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by your Honorable Court, to require the written statement 
to be given within six months and to thereby "afford the city 
authorities the opportunity to investigate tl1e circumstances, 
examine the locality and discover the witnesses while their 
recollections were fresh, i. e. within six months after the in-
jury occurred and the cause of action arose, so that the city 
would be in position at the trial of the cas~ to defend the 
action. There is neither reason, justice, necessity or excuse 
for the courts by judicial construction of this section to make 
the written statement a part of the injured citizen's cause of 
action, and to make it a different or new cau~e of action from 
the injury itself. It was, therefore, not necessary to have 
alleged in the original declaration that such 'vritten statement 
had been given to the City Attorney. The original declara-
tion itself was not faulty for its omission to so allege. For 
the defendant could at the trial have introduced evidence in 
support of a motion or under the general jssue that no such 
written statement had been given the City Attorney within 
six months after sueh cause of action had accrued to the plain-
tiff and upon proof of such extraneous fact could have had 
the plaintiff's cause of action dismissed. But this specific 
question does not arise in this case, because when the de-
fendant demurred to the original declaration and alleged as 
its sole ground of demurrer that the plaintiff had not given 
the verified written statement, the plaintiff by leave, amended 
her declaration by inserting and alleging therein: . · 
'' • • '"' that she filed with the City Attorney of the City of 
Richmond within six months after the aforesaid cause of ac-
tion accruing to her, written statements verified by her agent 
and attorney, of the nature of her claim and of the time and 
place at which the said injury is alleged to have occurred or 
been received or sustained by her by reason of the aforesa.id 
negligence of the said City of Richmond.'' 
After the learned trial court upon her so. amending her 
declaration overruled the defendant's demurer to the declara-
tion as amended, and late1·," after full argument specifically 
held (R., bottom 26, top 27), that the "am.enrl1nent" does not 
of itself change the cause of action no1· make a new case, it 
merely supplies one of the admitted req-uisites connected u.1ith 
b·ut essential to the plaintiff''s case which should have been 
averred in the original declaration.'' 
This ruling of the learned trial court in allowing the 
amendment to be made and in overruling the defendant's 
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demurrer to the declaration as amended, is in accordance 
with the liberal policy of this state declared in its statutes: 
.Code Sections 6085, 6104, 6250 and 6409. 
It is also in accordance with the practice and decisions of 
the trial courts of this state and with the law repeatedly laid 
down by th~ Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia .. 
See Sta;n.dard Paint Co. vs. E. K. Vietor db Co., 120 Va. 595; 
91 S. E. 752, especially at 755 to 756; where the court dis-
cussing this subject, among other things, said: 
"It is claimed, however, that because the sales were made 
on different dates, and each sale and warranty constitute a 
different and new cause of action, to per1nit these amend-
ments added new, separate and distinct causes of action to 
each of the counts in the original declaration. 
In New River lJfineral Co. v. Painter, 100 Va. 507; 42 S'. E. 
300, the plaintiff was allowed to amend the declaration which 
charged that a lawful act had b.eeu.negligently done, by add-
ing a count wl1ich alleged that the act itself was unlawful, 
and the rule is stated thus: 
'Counsel have not cited, nor have we in our investigation 
found, any decision of this court 'vhich indicates what amend-
ments of the declaration the court may allow after appear-
ance ; but there are many decisions upon the question in other 
jurisdictions. The .rule generally prevailing seems to be that 
S'ltch atnen.cbnents will be pennittecl as have fo1· thei1· object 
the tt·ial and determination of the s-ztbject-'ma,tter of the con-
troversy u.pon whi.ch the actio·n 'Was orignally based, but 
amendments will not be allowed which bring into the case a 
new and substantive cause of action different from that de-
clared on, and different from that which the plaintiff in-
tended to assert when he instituted his action. If the plain-
tiff in the anwnderl rlecla.ration i.~ attem.ptin9 to assert rights 
and to enforce claim.s m·ising out of the samu=! transaction, act, 
a.,qree1nent, or obligation, however great 'ma?J be the di.fference 
in the fonn of liab,ility a·s conta.i1zed in the amu~nded fonn that 
stated in the orig,inal declaration, it 'Will nrJt be regarded as 
for a new cmt.se of action·. In such cases the original and 
amended declarations and the count or counts in each are 
regarded as variations in the form of liability to meet the 
possible scope and varying phases of the testimony, which 
is one of the very objects and purposes of adding several 
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counts, and of making amendments to a declaration. Snyder 
v. Harper, 24 Va. 206, 211; Smith v. Pal'mer, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 
513, 519; Yost v. Eby, 23 Pa. 327, 331.' 
''The amendment allowed here was strictly within this 
rule.'' 
I 
''From the institution of this action the cause of the con-
troversy was clearly and distinctlJJ understood by both 11arties 
to it. It was the S'lt,bject of nu1nerous interviews between them 
a;nd of volwmino'l.t-S correspondence, and the case made by the 
amend1nents was the sa1ne case referred tiJ in the declara-
tion." 
So it was in the case at bar, the nature of the plaintiff's 
claim and the time and place at which her injury oceurred 
'were thoroughly understood by the cit;lJ fro·m the f:~rbove u:rit-
ten statements and letters-'all filed with the City Attorney 
within the six months period. 
Id. page 756 where the court said: 
"The statutes above quoted are remedial, and must be 
liberally construed to advance the remedy and avoid the 
evils which they seek to cure. lJI.cl(ee v. B~t,n.ting, McNeal R. 
E. Co., 114 Va. 639, 77 S. E. 516; Langhorne v. Richn~ond City 
R. Co., 81 Va. 367, 22 S. E. 357; Norfolk c:0 Western Ry. Co. 
v. Pe1·d·zte, 117 Va. 117, H3 S. E. 105R." 
Icl., page 757 : 
"Since the act of March 27, 1914, S'ltpra, it i.e; apparent that 
this co·u,.rt should extend the doctrine of harmless error to its 
logical conclttsion, namely, that e1·ro1· {s har·mless which does 
rwt inj'lt-riottsly affect the interests of the party cornplaining, 
and that S'ltch injitry is not preswmed, bu,.t m1.tst affinnatit·ely 
appear fron~ the record; .for that act in sim,ple and 'lt,na'Jnbigu-
ous lang'ltage directs the co~trts, at every .c:tage of the tJro-
oeeding, to disrega.rd any error o1· defect in the proceedin.cJ 
1.vhich does not atf ect the s-u.bstant·ial r-ights (If the parties.'' 
S'ee also in accord : 
R1.Msel Lumbe1· Co. vs. Tho1npson, 137 Va. 386, 119 S. E. 
117; 
Bailey vs. Li.nes, 131 Va. 421, 109 S. E. 370; 
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Payne vs. B'rown, 133 Va. 222; 112 S. E. 833; 
Gaines vs. Garber, 131 Va. 59, 108 S. E . .SHS; 
Deane vs. Deane, 122 V a. 513, 95 S. E. 431. 
A.s 'vas said by the learned trial judge in his written opin-
ion when he permitted your petitioner to amend her declara-
tion: 
''The amend1nent ~ * * does not of itself change the ca'ltse 
of action nor 'make a new case, .it merely supplies one of the 
admi.tted requisites connected with but essential to the plain-
tiff's case which sho~tld ha.ve been averred in the original 
declaration.'' 
Your petitioner represents that the amendment was ger-
mane to the original cause of ac.tion; dealt with the same 
transaction and did not introduce .any new cause of action. 
See 0 arpente1· vs. 1Jf eredith, 122 V a. . ... , 96 S. E. 635, a 
slander case amended after the expiration of tl1e year, where 
your Honorable court said: 
"The new 1natter * * * had reference to and wa.s merely 
a.n a1n11li[ication of charges conta.ined in the origi'ltal allega· 
tions." * * * 
See also Lorillard Co., Inc., v. Clay, 104 S. E. 384, at 386, 
where your Honorable Court said: 
"If there had been a judgment on the original declaration, 
it co'ltld have been pleaded in bar of the g1·1Jun(l of action set 
up in the amendment, and this is a sufficient fest of the char-
acter of the a1nendm.ent, in New River .illin. Co. v. Painter, 
100 Va. 507, 42 S. E. 300, which has been consistently followed 
in this court, it is said: 
'If an a1ne1-uled declartaion assert rights or clai1ns a1·ising 
o~et of the sarne trmtsaction, act, agre1nent, or obligation as 
that upon which the original declaration is fo'ltnded, it 'JlJill 
not be regarded as for a new ca,u.se of action., however great 
may be the difference in the form of liability asserted in the 
two declarations.' '' 
Applying the test here laid down by your J-Ionorable Court, 
it appears that the amendment simply alleged that your peti-
tioner had filed with the City Attorney within six months 
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after her cause of action accrued to her, written. statements 
of the nature of her claim ·and of the time and place at which 
the injury referred to in the original deelaration occurred 
and did not set up any new cause of action, but the amend-
ment was germane to the original cause of action, dealt with 
the same transaction, clearly alleged facts with which the de-
fendant was entirely familiar by reason of the notices pre-
viously -given and its allowance was in furtherance .of sub-
stantial justice and the rights of the parties. 
· Your petitioner further represents that the learned trial 
court erred in holding (R., 37), that the plaintiff h~d not 
given any notice. 
'On this point. your petitioner refers the court to the al-
Jegations of her replication to defendant's plea of the Statute 
of Limitations (R .. , 30-35), from 'vhich it appears that on 
April 28th, 1923, three days after the plaintiff was injured 
that your petitioner's son, B. A. Jackson, 'vho was acting 
for and as the agent of your petitioner, addressed a letter 
(verified by his oath), to the ·City Attorney lR., 30-31), and 
asked him to "accept this letter as a notit..~e" of your peti-. 
tioner's injury and da.nta_qes and in which he said that, "the 
injury occurred on the night of Wednesday, the 25th of April, 
1923, * * ·~ at or near and between 22nd and .6J3rd Streets on 
Leigh Street on -the so~tth sidewalk and in or about the middle . 
of the city block'', and then set forth the place where your pe-
titioner resided, and the hospital in which your petitioner 
·\Vas then being treated for her broken arm, hipbone and other 
injuries. 
This verified notice \Vas followed and supplemented oy 
a letter on May 31, 1923, addressed and given ·to the City 
Attorney in which the nature of her claim and the time and 
place at which the injury occurred were fully set out and that 
her claim against the city for damages had resulted from a 
fall caused by loose bricks and broken and nneven pavement 
on the south side of Leigh Street between 22rid and 2:3rd 
Streets on the night of April 25th, 1923, * .;c: * and that she 
fell by reason of the dangerous and unsafe condition of the 
city pavement. The foregoing notice and letter were supple-
mented on September 17, 1923, by your petitioner's attorneys 
delivering to the City Attorney, an exact copy of the original 
declaration filed in this case which set out in detail the nature 
of her claim and the time and place at which she alleged her 
injuries occurred. This copy of the declarati011 was delivered 
t9 the defendant on S'eptembcr 17, 1923, !:'It the time of the 
institution of the suit and on September 2fi, 1923, your pe-
titioner's ~ttorneys filed with the City Attorney another writ-
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ten statement; verified by oath of your petitioner, or the na-
ture of her claim and the time and place at which the injuries 
are alleged to have oc.curred. See said written notice (R., 
32-33). All of these notices were :filed with the attorney for 
the City of Richmond withi11~ six 'months after your petition-
er's cause of action had accnted to her on .A.z1ril 25th, 1923. 
The amended declaration and replication of your petitioner 
to the defendant's plea of the Statute of Limitations allege 
and show all this; and the replication alS\) ~lieges that the 
city, after it got said notices, acted on them, and, in the lan-
guage of your Honorable Court, '' investig·oted the circum-
.stances, exa,mined the locality in which the inj-ury was alleged 
to h(]llJe occurred, and had lull opportumit'l} to discover the 
witnesses p'romptly so as to ascertain the .facts while their 
~recollections were fresh". So that the record thus shows that 
the city was repeatedly given full notice of ''the nature'' of 
your petitioner's "c1aim and of th~ time anrl place at which 
the injury was alleged to have occurred", and had full oppor-
t~6nity to investigate the cirawmstances,. exa'mine the "locality 
and to discover the witnesses witki11t the six 1nonths '' after 
yO'u..r petitioner's C(}Jltse of action accrued. 'l~he learned trial 
court, therefore, erred in reversing its first holding and in 
dinally holding that no sufficient notice had been given the 
City Attorney 'vithin six months after her cause of action 
accrued and that your petitioner had no rjght of action be-
cause the amendment alleging that such notice had been given 
within six months made a new case. 
Your peti t.ioner represents that in determining the suf-
dlciency of the notices to the city the court must obviously find 
that they were necessar~ily sttpple1nentary to. each othe·r; arnd 
t.ha t, even though the first notice of April 2R, 1923, did not 
fully notify the city of the nature of the plaintiff's c·laim 
and of the time and place at which the injury is alleged to 
have occurred (which we deny) yet the supplementary no-
tices given thereafter (all actually within the five months 
after your petitioner's cause of action accrued). necessarily 
and inevitably gave the city full notice of fliP nat·ztre of the 
claim, and of the tinw and place at which thl~ -in.i·tM"JJ occ-u.rred 
a.nd d,id this within. six m-onths after JIO·u·r petitioner's cau.se 
of action accrz~ed. Your petitioner represent~ that this is all 
the statute, Section 19G of charter, requires. The purpose of 
the statute as declared by your Honorable Court in the above 
case of O'Neil vs. CUy of Richm.ond, were fully co1npl-ietl with 
withi·n the six 'months' period after the catUse of action ac-
crued, and it is inconceivable that the city was in any wa.y 
injured by lack of more notices or could have been given any 
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further or additional information or needed any further ad-
ditional information in order "to investi.f]ate the circum-
stances, exantine the local·ity in. ~vhich the 'i'Y!jttry is alleged 
to have ocmtrred and to discover the witnesses prontptly". 
The very first notice given on April 28th, 1.923, within three 
days after the injury, gave the City of Richmond suffident 
information to enable it "to investigate flu~ cirmtmstances, 
exa.mine the locality and to discover the ~witnesses". It also 
gave your 1Jetitioner' s address and in what hospital she was 
at that time confined a.c; a result of the inju,ries, described the 
nature of her claim, her injuries and the time and pla.ce and 
upon what S'ide~valk of the c·ity that the in.iur·ies oco-urred. 
''That is certain which is capable of bevn.Q 1nade certain,'' 
and even though the notice of April 28th, 1923, ·which was 
·given to the city within three days after the accident might 
have possibly been fuller, yet this notice contains sufficient 
information to put the defendant upon inquiry and to have 
enabled the City Attorney to have fully "investigated the 
circumstances, examined the localtiy, interviewed your peti-
tioner and to have discovered the witnesseq ''. It is a well 
established rule of law, ''that information which, if followed 
up by inquiry, must lead to knowledge, is equivalent not only 
to notice but also to knowledge". 
T'lt.cker vs. Constable, 16 Ore. 407, 19 Pac. 13; Knapp vs. 
Bailey, 8 Atl. 122, 124, 79 :Me. 195, 1 Am. St. R. 295, where the 
court held: 
''If a party has knowledge of such facts as would lead a 
fair and prudent man using ordinary caution to make further 
inquiry and he avoids inquiry, he is chargeable ·with 'notice 
of the facts 'vhich by ordinary diligence he 'vould have ascer-
tained'.'' 
.:tn J(in,qten vs. Thackeray, 121 N. W. 8:3!), 840 (23 S. D. 
329), it was held : 
"In law, that is 'notice' of a fact which "rould provoke a 
reasonably prudent man to such inquiries as, pursued with 
reasonable diligence, would lead to full kno,~tledge. '' 
In lJT arden vs. Addington, 115 S. E. 241.~ 131 Ky. 296, it 
was held: 
''Notice may be the existence of that which if looked at or 
listened to, then followed up by such inquiry as ordinary pru-
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dence would suggest would result in obtaining the knowl-
edge sought to be c.harged.'' 
In Kellog vs. Randolph (N. J.), 63 Atl. 753, 754, it was 
held: 
"Whatever puts a person upon inquiry ~amounts in judg-
ment of law to notice', provided the inquiry becomes a duty 
-and could lead to the knowledge of the requisite facts by 
the exercise of ordinary diligence and understanding.'' 
This is not a case in which the above 'lwti,;e wholly failed 
to state the na.t~tre of the clai1n a'ltd the titn(~ and place of the 
accident. · 
This notice was intended to be given by the party injured-
laymen. It is not required to be as full nor specific as a no-
tice of motion for judgment or a pleading. As was said by 
your Honorable Court : 
''The notice is no procrustean bed on which to stretch un-
wary litigants." See. 
The notice in this case furnished the defendant sufficient 
means of knowledge to put him upon inquiry, and to have 
enabled him to make full investigations not only of the facts 
stated in the notice, but of everything to which such investiga-
tion m.ight have led. 
These statutes, like notice to purchasers of land, should 
be held sufficient wherever they give the city sufficient notice 
to put it on inquiry and to enable it to investigate the cir-
cumstances and the time and place of the alleged injury. 
See Rorer Iron Co. vs. T'rout, 83 Va. 397. 
And of everything to 'vhich such notice might lead. 
Sh(IJlter vs . .Alterton, 151 U. S. 607, 14 S. C. R. 442, 38 L. 
Ed. 286. . 
In addition, in the case at bar, the first notice of April 
28th, 1923, was supplemented by a letter written to the de-
fendant's City Attorney, under date of May 31, 1923, Sep-
tember 17, 1923, and September 25th, 1923. 
In view of all the notices, all supplemental to each other, 
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hvo of which were given before the institution of this suit, 
and all of which were given within the six months period then 
allowed by the city charter, to defend this action on the 
ground of lack of notice of the nature of the claim, and time 
and place of the accident, would be indeed to stretch her 
and many of the public hereafter upon ''Pl'ocrustean beds'' 
and to deprive litigants of just claims by placing a harsh 
or construction upon it not plainly within its 
ordinary or usual meaning, and to legislate and read into 
the statute requirements which are not in it. 
These 1iotices, like notices of motion for .iudgment, should 
be held, or be presumed, to be the acts of f..'arties and con-
strued lib~rally in favor of the party giving the notice. 
Cent1·al Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 94 Va. l:!:fi. 
T~e notice should be held to be sufficient where the city 
could make out the object of the notice and '\vould enable it to 
investigate the claim and the time and place of the injury .. 
On the question: ''Does the amendment make a new case 
so that the limitation runs to the filing of the amended plea 
and is this action barred?" Or, "does the amendment re-
late back to the original declaration~" 
We respectfully contend as was set forth in the quota-
tion by the court from Burk's Pleading and Practice, page 
392: 
11 If the antendntent sets 'U]J no new ca~tse of action or claim, 
and makes no new dernan.ds, rn~rt si1nply vartes and expends 
the original caruse of action, the wnencl1nent relates baok to 
the contrnence1nent of the action and stops the rttnning of the 
statute as of that date; but an amendment which introduces 
a new or different cause of action or makes a new or dif-
ferent demand, does not relate back and the Rta.tute continues 
to run till date of amendment." 
On this point see P. Lon·ilard Co., Inc., v~. Clay, 127 Va. 
734, 104 S. E. 386, where the Court said: 
''The injury complained of was inflicted October 18, ·1917. 
The declaration containing two counts was filed in Augnst, 
1918, and the plaintiff was allowed to amend his declaration 
by adding a third count on ~farch 14, 1919. The amendment 
consisted in charging an addi tiona I ground of negligence on 
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the part of the defendant, to-wit, that the drill was out of re-
pair and was too heavy to use with a one~fourth inch bit, 
'vhich resulted in the injury complained of. Objection was 
made in several forms that the amendment stated a new · 
cause of action which was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. It is very clear that the· amend~ent does not state a 
new cause of action. In the language of Whittle, J., in Wise 
Term.inal Co. v. McCorrnick, 107 Va. 376, 378, 58 ~s .. E. 584, 
585: . 
The amended declaration merely charges the negligence 
complained of in a varying form to meet different phases of 
the evidence. 
If there had been a judgment on the orginal declaration, 
it could have been pleaded in bar of the ground of action set 
up in the amendment, and this is a sufficient test of the char-
acter of the amendment. In New River Mi11. Co. v. Pai.nter, 
100 Va. 507, 42 S. E. 200, which has been consistently followed 
in this court, it is said: 
I 
Lf an amended declaration assert rights or claims arising 
o1lt of the .~atne transaction, act, agreement, or obligation as 
that upon which the original decl~ration is founded, it will 
not be rega1·ded as for a new cause of act-ion. however great 
may be the difference in the form of liability asserted in the 
two declarations. 
See, also, Seal v. Portland Cenwnt Co., lOR Va. 806, 62 S. 
}J. 795; Bmmna;n v. Fit·st National Bank, 115 Va. 463,.80 S. 
E. 95; Standard Pa.int Co. v. Vietor, 120 Va. 595, 91 S. E. 752; 
Whalen v. Go1·don, 95 Feel. 305, 37 C. C ..... ~. 70, and cases cited; 
Ra-ilroad Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 12 Sup. Ct. 905, 36 L. Ed. 
829, and numerous citations in Burk's PJeading and Pr., 
p. 402, note 14." 
And see, also, CartJenter vs. Meredith, 122 Va. 446, 96 s: 
E. 635, at 636, where the court said: 
"The second amended declaration was withdrawn on the 
day on which it was filed. The cause stood practically as if 
the second amendment l1ad never been filed. The filing and 
. immediate withdrawal of the latter could not have prejudiced 
the defendant. vVhile the record is not entirely satisfactory 
upon that subject, it see1ns reasonably clear that the court 
and the part-ies understood that the defendant's plea of the 
statute. of limitations and of not guilty were directed to the 
last-amended decla'ration, 'vhich purported to amend the six 
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statutory counts of the original as formerly modified by the 
!first amendment. This seems to have been the view enter-
tained by the court, and, if we concede that the procedure 
was irreg•u.lar the pt·actical result was in accord 'With the set-
tled policy of our law to allow arnen.d1nents ·in pleadings and 
to disregard defects in procedure which do not operate to 
the prej-udice of the substant·ial rights of the· oppos·ite party. 
Standard Paint Co. v. E. !(. Victor & Co., 120 Va. 595, 605, 
610, 91 S. E. 752; Acts 1914, e. 331, p. 641. . 
The next assignment of error presents the question of the 
sufficiency of the plea of the statute of limitations to the 
•first count of the amended declaration. It is urged that the 
insulting words attributed to the defendant in this amend-
ment constitute a new cause of action. If this position be 
sound, the plea of the statute was good, because the words 
were alleged to have been uttered at a date more than 12 
months prior to the amendment. .A. careful compar·ison. of 
1the or_qi'J'Uil and am.ended avennents, however, lead 'l.tS to 
the conclu,sion that the new 1natter had reference to a1ul was· 
merely· an antplification of the charges contained in the origi-
nal, and that the case does not, as clainted by the defendant,. 
fall within the influence of the decision of thi.<..· court in I r'Ui'l~e 
v. Barrett, 119 Va. 587, 89 S. E. 904, Ann. Cas. 1917 C. 62." 
In il'IcLa1l-ghlin vs. Norfolk (N. C.), 93 S. E. 748, the Court 
said: 
''It also follows, if the amen(l'Jnent is germane to the origi-
nal ca·u .. ~e of action, deals with the sa.'Jne t1·a;nsaction, and does 
not intt·oduce a new ca;use of action, it relates back to the 
comm,encement of the action, and prevents the ntnnin.Q of the 
statute of lintitat,ions fro 'In that t·in~e. Pickett v. Railroad, 153 
N. C. 149, 69 S. E. 8, and Lefler v. La.ne, 170 N. C. 183, 86 S'. 
E. 1022.'' 
In R1t.ssell Luntber Contpany vs. Tho1n1Json, .... Va ..... , 
119 S. E. 117, ''rhere the court said: 
''The Virginia statute (Code 6104, 6250, and 6409) allow 
substantial amendments in the pleadings for the promotion 
of justice, and they have always been liberally construed by 
th~s court as remedial in purpose. New River JJ!Iineral Co. 
v. Painter, 100 Va. 507, 42 S. E. 300; Ches. & 0. Ry. Co. v. 
Swartz, 115 Va. 730, 80 S. E. 568; N. & liV. Ry. Co. v. Perdue, 
117 Va. 116, 83 S. E. 1058; Standard POJint Oo. v. Vietor, 120 
V a. 595, 81 S'. E. 752. 
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Applying the statutory rule to this case, we think that the 
trial court should have permitted the amendment when it was 
11rst offered, before the evidence for the plaintiffs had been 
fully submitted. This a1nenchnent ~vas gennane, related to the 
sante contract, and the right to 1Mecover deyended upon the 
same alle,qed breach thereof by the defenda·nts. The charge 
o·nly antplified the szJecific ite'l'ns o·r cooses of the darnages and 
the a11no·unt clai1ned for such aUeged breach.'' 
See New River ilfineral Co. vs. Pai-rtter, 100 Va. 507, where 
the court said : 
''The rule generally prevailing seems to be that such 
amendments will be permitted as have for their object the 
trial and determination of the subject matter of the contro-
versy upon which the action was orignally based, but amend-
ments will not be allowed which bring into the case a new and 
substantive cause of action different from that declared on, 
and different from that which the plaintiff intended to as-
sert when he instituted his action. Lf the plaintiff in the 
amended declaration is attempting to assert. rights and to 
enforce claims arising out of the same transaction, act, agree-
ment or obligation, however great may be the difference in 
the form of liability as contained in the amended form that 
stated in the original declaration, it will not be regarded as 
for a new cause of action. In such cases, the original and 
amended declarations and the count or counts in each are 
regarded as variations in the form of liability to meet the pos-
sible scope and varying phaseE of the testimony, which iE 
one of the very objects and purposes of adding several counts, 
and of making amendments to a declaration. Snyder v. 
Ifat·pm·, 24 W. Va. 206, 211; Sntith v. Palmer, 6 Cush. 513, 
519; Yost v. Ely, 23 Pa. St. 327, 331. '' 
The court here was clearly right in allowing this amend-
ment because the amendment relates back to the only cause 
of action asserted in the notice of motion and cannot in any 
sense be regarded as and for a new cause of action. In fact, 
the cause of action set up in the declaration gre'v out of the 
injury, and not out of the notice which the amendment al-
leged 'vas given the defendant. 
In Norfolk Sou,thern Ry. Co. vs. Greenwith Corp., 122 Va. 
6:31, 95 S. E. 389, cited in :M~emo. of the court, where the suit 
was brought by the Greenwith Corporation, the court, during 
the trial allowed the plaintiff to amend the declaration by: 
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"Making J. R·. Simpson and C. C. Hudgins, individually 
and as partners trading as Simpson and Hudgins, parties 
plaintiff'' * • * 
The court held that the amendment ''substituted an entirely 
new plaintiff after it had become manifest that the -orig'llal 
plaintiff could not maintain the action ***and that the amend-
ment made a clear misjoinder of parties, and that there could 
not be an entire change of parties plaintiff or defendant by 
amendments.'' 
This case, therefore, does not sustain the City's conten-
tion in the case at bar. 
This f'.ase is not in point and has no application to the case 
at bar which 
"merely alleges * * * compliance with the charter and does 
not change the cause of action or make a new case or new 
parties.'' 
In Irvme vs. Ba-rrett, 119 Va. 587, 89 S. E. 904, cited in the 
memorandum of the {~ourt, is not in point and does not sus-
tain the contention of the City in this case. There the action 
was one of slander, and the words originally charged in the 
original declaration were not actionable 11er se and the court 
held that they could not by amendment be enlarged in their 
meaning merely by addition of an innuendo, filed 18 months 
after the alleged slander. · 
The court held that the words charged in the amended 
declaration were not the same as those charged in the origi-
. nal declaration and the second amended declaration. 
"-They do not purport to have been spoken at the same 
time and place or to the same person, and cou~d not have 
been intended merely to amplify the language imputed to 
the defendant in the original declaration with the view of 
setting out the same cause of action in different phrase. In-
deed, the words imputed to the defendant in the second count 
were not even known to the plaintiff until the year following 
the bringing of the original action. It would .seem plain on 
principle that, no matter on how many separate occasions 
one may utter slanderous ":-ords about another (though all 
may refer to the same transaction), each slm1der constitutes 
a new cause of action. .A fortiori must that be true where 
the subsequent slanderous words are essentially different 
Amanda A. Jackson v. Ci.ty of Ricl1mond. 21 
from those spoken in the first instance, and on another occa-
sion, and to another person.'' 
It is, therefore, plain that this case is not in point and does 
not sustain the city'~ contention made in t~e instant case. 
The case of Agee vs. Virginian Railroad (fo1npany, 98 W. 
Va: 109, 126 S. E. 564, was a case in which .... 1.\.gee sued the 
Virginian Railway Company instead the agent designated by 
the President. Under the Transportation A.ct of 1920, the 
court held that the action was improperly brought against 
the railroad company and that an amendment substituting 
the agent of the Government for the railroad eompany which 
was not made within two years after the passage of the 
Transportation Act of 1920 was barred because it "was in 
effect the bringing of a new action after expirft.tion of the time 
allowed by the Federal Statute for the in~titution of such 
actions''. The case is not analagous to the present one an( 
is not in point. 
In liusk Admr. vs. Nor folk and H7 estern Ra.i/.road, U. 8'. Cir. 
Ct.. App. ( 4 Va. Law Register 731) cited in the memo. of the 
court, the court there held that in the absence of a statute 
an administrator could not maintain a suit in the courts of 
the state other than the one in which he qualifies if the ob-
jection be properly and seasonably made. But the objection 
ca·me too la.te, and after a plea to the merits (JJIUl after the 
lapse of sufficient tin~e to bllr the 11laintiff's 1·i,qht of action; 
and the domiciliary representative of the decreased appointed 
in another state, if pending the action he takes out ancillary 
· letters of administration in this state, they would relate back 
to the institution of the answer for the purpose of preserving 
plaintiff's action and that the pleas could be amended to show 
the facts as 'veil at law as in equity. 
This authority not only sustained your petitioner's right 
to amend in this case, but sustains the 11laintiff's plea in this 
case that the city o'ltght not to be alloweil, after receiving 
witho~tt objection the notices within the six n~onths' period 
·mention-ed in the charter, to ob'ject to the sufficiency of those 
notices after the lapse of the six months period. 
On the question of whether the notice is in fact sufficiently 
definite as to the nature of the claim and the time and place 
of the injury, the rule of liberal construction should have been 
adopted by ·the trial court. See Botvles vs. City of Richuwnd, 
.... Va. 133, S. E. 593, where your Honorable Court said: 
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''Statutes and ordinances of the character of this in judg-
ment are harsh in their application and are to be liberally 
construed." Citing City of Chicago vs. Gilbet·t, fiT Ind. App. 
61S, 108 S. E. 29. 
Your petitioner is advised and represents that the notice 
required to be given under the cl1arter was intended to be 
,given by laymen, injured persons and not by lawyers highly 
trained in the language of the law: 
"The proceeding in the case, as we have seen, 'vas hy mo-
tion upon notice. The rule governing notices is that they are 
presumed to be the act of the parties, and not of lawyers, and 
are vie,ved with great indulgence by the courts. If the notice 
be such that the defendant cannot mistake its object, it will 
be sufficient. Supervisors v. Dunn, 27 Gratt. 608.'' 
U1vion Cent1·al Life Ins. Co. v. Polla1~d, 84 Va. 137, at 153. 
The City could not have mistaken the object of the notices 
given it in this case. It is inconceivable that it needed more 
notice. 
·wAIVER AND ESTOPPEL. 
Your petitioner further represents that in as much as the 
notice of April 28, 1923, 'vas addresesd to the City Attorney 
and in part read : 
''Please accez1t this as a. notice of in.ittrry and damzage to 
the perso·n of A1nanda A. Jackson, etc." 
This was follo,ved by the letter of May Bl, 1923, and an-
other notice of September 25, 1923,. If the City Attorney was 
not going to accept said notices as sufficient, he 'vas called 
upon to then reply and to notify Amanda A. Jackson, cer-
tainly within the six months period that he would not so ac-
cept said letter, and by his failu're so to do he is estopped from 
claiming after the six months period that the notices were 
insufficient. 
The record shows that there was no objection made by the 
City Attorney at any time within the six months, that the 
rfirst notice, or that any of the notices were insufficient for 
any reason. On the contrary the defendant never prepared 
its demurrer and sworn pleas until February 22nd, 1927, 
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when it for the first time raised the question of sufficiency 
of the notices. 
Your petitioner submits that as· the City was expressly 
called upon to accept the verified letter of April 28, 1923, 
as a notice of your petitioner's injury and claim, it should 
not be permitted to stand by under these circumstances and 
wait until after six months had expired and then refuse to ac-
cept it as su.ch notice and object for the first time to the suf-
ficiency of the notice arnd then plead the Statute of Limita-
tions on the ground of lack of st~tfficienJ notice 'lvithm the six 
1nonths period. 
The City received this and the other notices without mak-
ing the slightest objection to them in any way. If the City 
had replied to your petitioner's letter of April 23, 1923, and 
made the objection within the six months period, the plaintiff 
could have ,filed other notices sufficient within the six month~, 
but the defendant having not replied and having raised no 
objection, but having stood silently by without refusing to 
accept the letter as sufficient notice until long after the six 
months had elapsed, should not ·be heard now to ask that the 
suit be dismissed for lack ·of notice and thus prevent a re-
covery at all by the plaintiff. 
See Lazaer vs. Ohio, etc., Foundry Co., 65 W. Va. 105-119, 
and 63 .S. E. 772. 
"Silence and passive acquiescence operates an estoppel 
·where a party knows of his right, btd takes no step to force 
the same u11~til the condition of the other party has in good 
faith becotne so changed that he cannot be restored to his 
jorme1· state." 
.See Ca1·ter vs. Pri.ce, 85 Vv. ·va. _744,.102 S. E. 685; fVilliams 
vs. Jones, 43 W.Va. 562; 27 S. E. 411; 38 L. R. A. -694; 64 
A.m. State Reports 891, 14 Am. and English Ency. of Law, 
643. Carroll-Cross Coal Co. vs. Ab1·a1ns Creek Coal, Etc., Co., 
83 W. Va. 205, 98 S. E. 148, 152. 
This disadvantage may come "from change of the condi-
tion, intervening equities or other causes. See Carter vs. 
Price, cited supra. Snead vs. Atkinson, 121 Va. ·182; 92 S'. 
E. 835. 
In the absence of a refusal to accept the verified letter of 
• A.pril 28, 1923, as a notice of her injury, your petitioner, the 
plaintiff, had no means of knowing that the defendant would 
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not so accept said letter, or that it would object to the suf-
ficiency of the verification, the description of the agent, or 
of the notices · itself after the six months period. On the 
other hand the defendant kne,v, or should be held to have 
known, that it was going to make these objections and also 
to have known that if it did not reply and dill object and the 
court sustained its objection, that this would c.hange your pe-
titioner's position to her detriment and irreparable· injury, 
and in such a case and under these circ.un1stances the de-
fendant is estopped. 
See: 
Mullen.s vs. Shrewsbtu·y, 60 W.Va. 694, 55 S. E. 746. 
Tern vs. McClung, 104 Va. 599. 
North British Ins. Co. vs. Robinett, 112 V a.. 754, 72 S. E. 
668. 
• Atlant·ic, Etc., Ry. Co. vs. Bryan, 109 Va. 523, 65 S. E. 30~ 
Your petitioners verified letter of April 28, 1923, expressly 
said to the 1City Attorney: . 
''Please accept this as notice of injury and damage,'' etc. 
This letter, or notice was not merely received but the repli-
cation to defendant's plea to the Statute of Limitations al-
leges that it was a.cted upon and full investigation made by 
the City of Richmond of the place, of the nature of the claim 
and the time and place at which the injury occurred. There-
after the city appeared and filed its grounds of defense, and 
as was said in the case of Bowles vs. City o.f Richlmond, .... 
Va ..... , 133 S'. E. 593, especially at pages 593-5: 
"Your petitioner was tol¢1 that the city was not liable not 
because· of want of verification but because of contributory 
negligence. '' 
In your petitioner's case the grounds of defense stated 
that the city was not liable not because of want of sufficient 
notice, but solely beeause of contributory negligence. 
·As was said by your Honorable Court in Bowles vs. City 
of Richmond: · 
"His statement to the plaintiff that the (lity relied upon • 
the defense of contributory negligence was, in substance, a 
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statement that the notice furnished was ample and gave the 
necessary data for proper investigation, that such investiga-
tion had been made, and that the claim was refused for the 
particular reason stated and for no other. The corporation 
counsel for the City of Richmond is no municipal mail box to 
receive notices and hold them for others. I-re is the chief or 
his department, and is clothed with all powers incident to the 
discharge of the duties that devolve upon him. Somebody 
had the right to say if this notice was sufficient and to act 
thereon. In the usual course of business this power was his 
and his only.'' 
" * * * But when it has been received and when full investi-
gation is had thereon by the city attorney, and when the claim 
l1as been rejected for some reason not connected with the form 
of notice or its contents, the notice has performed its func-
tion, and defects therein can no longer be relied upon to pre-
vent a recovery.'' 
''There is nothing socrosanct about these notices; faith and 
fair intent must prevail. Here a notice was given in all re-
spects -regular except that it was not verified. That notice 
'vas not merely received, but it was acted on after full in-
vestigation. Petitioner ".,as told that the city 'vas not liable 
not because of w·ant of verification, but because of contribu-
tory negligence. In other words, the plaintiff 'vas told, no 
matter what may be the form of your petition you have no 
claim upon its merits and the city will pay you nothing. It 
1V&nld violate everJJ principle of fa·ir dealings for the city to 
,<;a.y you 'may have had a case, bu.t tv-ith a rerl herring we have 
distracted yottr attent·ion fro'ln a fa.fal technical O'mission in 
'tiOUr notice. 'JtVe have z,ulled you to sleep and nO'W yottr day 
of grace has passed.'' 
To the same effect see 21 C. J., p. 1202, Section 20~S, where 
it is said: 
"TVhe1·e a. person has, w-ith knowledge ortl~e facts, acted 
o,r condu.cted hhnse.!f -i·n a particular manne1·, or asserted a 
part-k·ular clari,rn, title, or right, he cannot afterward asswme 
a 1Jositio·n in.conssitent u;oith such act, clai1n o1· conduct to the 
pre:itulice of a~nother who has acted i1t rel-iance on s·uch con-
duct or represe1ztations.'' 
Your petitioner therefore for the above reasons and for 
other errors appearing upon the face of the record, submit 
tl1at the trial court erred in holding that yorir petitioner had 
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no right of action until she gave notice and that the amend-
ment to the declaration changed the cause of action and made 
a new case, and in sustaining defendant's plea of the Statute 
.of Limitations and in dismissing your petitioner's case and 
entering judgment against her therein for costs, and prays 
that the judgment of the said court may be reversed and set 
aside and the case remanded to the lower court for a trial to 
be had upon the issues involved in this causf?, and your peti-
tioner will ever pray. 
Respectfully submitted, 
AMANDA A. JACKSON. 
By JOHN HIRSCHBERG, 
M. J. FULTON, 
Counsel. 
I, M. J. Fulton, Attorney at Law, practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in my 
opinion it is proper that the decision of the Law and Equity 
1Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, in this case as set 
forth in the above petition, should be reviewed and reversed 
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
M. tT. FULTON. 
January 26th, 1928. 
Received January 26, 1928. 
tT. F. W. 
Writ of error allowed and supersedeas awarded. Bond 
$300.00 
JESSE F. WEST. 
January 30, 1928. 
Received January 30, 1928. 
H. S. J. 
• 
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VIRIGNIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Beverly T. Crump, Judge of 
the Law and Equity '0ourt of the City of Richmond, held 
for the said ~City at the ·Court-room thereof, in the City 
Hall, on the 16th day of ·September, 1927. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
office of the said Law and Equity Court of the City of Rich-
mond at the Rules lield for the said Court on the First Mon-
day in October, 1923 : Came Amanda A. "T ackson, by Coun-
sel and filed her Declaration against the City of Richmond, 
which Declaration is in the words and figures following, to-
wit: . 
Virginia: 
In the La"r & Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Amanda A. Jackson 
vs. 
The City of Richmond, a ~Iunicipal Corporation. 
Amanda A. Jackson complains of the City of Richmond; 
a. municipal corporation of the State of Virginia, of a plea 
of trespass on the case for this, to-wit: 
That heretofore, to-wit, on or about April 25, 1923, the 
said City of Richmond 'vas a municipal Corporation created 
. by the laws of 'the State of Virginia, and as such· owned and 
was in the control and possession of cert8.in public streets 
·lying within the corporate limits of the said City and par-
ticularly of the public street known as Leigh Street, and said 
'valks thereof, over and upon which said sidewalks in said 
public street persons walked and traveled both by day and 
night; and it thereupon became and was its duty to exercise 
all proper care to keep the same in reasonably safe order and 
condition for the public to use, and especialJy for the plain-
tiff and other pedestrians to walk over, upon and along dur-
ing the day and night itme; yet the said defendant 
page 2 ~ not regarding its duty in this behalf, wholly neg-
lected and failed so to do. 
And the plaintiff says that on or about April 25, 1923, that 
she was walking in said street, along and on the side walk 
or pavement of said Leigh Street, on the South side thereof, 
between the intersection of 22nd and 23rd Streets, during the 
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night time, exercising all due and proper care on her part, 
and that the said defendant had then and theretofore neg·li-
gntly and c.arelessly permitted and allo,vHd the surface of 
said sidewalk on said street at that point to be and become 
uneven and the bricks therein to become loose and to lay 
loose and scattered a bout on said street, and to be in a danger-
ous, defective and unsafe condition for use hy the plaintiff 
and other pedestrians, so that while the said plaintiff was 
then and there walking along said street on !-mi.d sidewalk, one 
of her feet, without negligence on her part, encountered said 
\1].neven and defective pavement and sidewalk and came in 
contact with the said loose and uneven brick~ in said sidewalk 
and pavement in said street, and she 'vaR thereby thrown 
and caused to fall with great force and violence on to and 
upon said sidewalk, breaking her left elbow and left hip bone 
and injuring her anlde, and that by reason of said fall and 
injury, she suffered a severe nervous shock, and was other-
wise wounded, bruised and injured, from which wounds, 
bruises and injuries the plaintiff has suffered ever since and 
still continues to suffer and has been permanently injured 
and disabled and rendered unable and unnt to perform any 
'vork or to follow her usual work, occupation and duties, and 
alway~ will be. She was also caused to exo011d large sums 
of money for medicine, nursing and doctor's bills, and will 
hereafter have to expend large and divers sums of money to 
be relieved of the pain, suffering and injury. 
And the plaintiff further says that she filed with the City 
Attorney of the said City of Richmond within sx months after 
the aforesad cause of action accrnNl to her written 
page 3 ~·statements verified by her, and her agent and at-
torney of the nature of her claims nnd of the time 
and place at which the said injury is alleged to have occurred 
or been received and sustained by her by reason of the afore-
said neg-ligence of the said City of Richmond. 
And the plaintiff says that she did not know of said dmiger-
ous and defective condition of said sidewalk and street be-
fore her said injury and that the defendant could have known 
of the same by the exercise of care on its part in time to have 
repaired the same and warned the plaintiff nnd other pedes-
trians of said defective and dangerous condition of said side-
walk at said point, but that it wholly neglected and failed 
so to do, and by reason of said negligence the plaintiff was 
injured as aforesaid and was put to much expense and loss 
of time in endeavoring to be healed and cured of her said 
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injuries, and has suffered great pain of body and anguish 
of mind, all to the damage of the plaintiff, Twenty-five Thou-
sand dollars ( $25,000.00). And, therefore, she sues. 
AMANDA A .• J.ACI{;SON, 
By Counsel. 
FULTON & WICK~ER, p. q. 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity Court 
of the ·City of R-ichmond, held the lOth day of December, 
1923. 
Amanda A. Jackson, plaintiff, 
against 
The City of Richmond, defendant. 
CASE. 
This day came the defendant by counsel and by leave of 
·Court filed herein a statement in writing declaring its inten-
tion to rely upon the contributory negligence of the plaintiff 
and its grounds of defense to this action. 
0 
page 4 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond: 
-~manda J. Jackson . 
vs. ,, 
The City of Richmond, a ~Iunicipal Corpo1~ation. 
This day came the City of Richmond by its Attorney and 
.says that it intends to rely upon the contributory negligence 
of the plaintiff as a defense to the above action, and filed the 
following statement of its defense herein: 
(1) That the plaintiff was guilty of negligence generally. 
(2) That the plaintiff did not take reasonable precaution 
for her own safety in failing to use her o·wn senses of sight, 
feeling, etc., to prevent her injury. 
(3) That the plaintiff did not take reasonable precaution 
for her own safety in failing to be unusually 'vatchful in her 
lookout and careful in her step in walking on a brick pave-
ment. 
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( 4) That the plaintiff did not take reasonable precaution 
for her own safety in failing to be unusually watchful in her 
lookout and careful in her step in walking on a brick pave-
ment, which pavements are generally and obviously uneven 
and broken. 
(5) That the plaintiff did not take reasonable precaution 
:for her own safety in failing to be watchfnl in her lookout 
and careful in her step in walking on a brick pavement which, 
if in the condition alleged, was an obvious and open condi-
tion. 
(6) That the plaintiff' did not take reasonable precaution 
for her own safety in failing to be watchful in her lookout 
and careful in her step in walking on a brick pavement with 
which she was well acquainted. 
page 5 ~ (7) That the plantiff did not take reasonable pre-
caution for her own safety in failing: to be watchful 
in her lookout and careful in her step in walking· on a brick 
pavement in the night-time and in vie·w of darkness. 
Respectfully submitted this lOth day of December, 1923. 
LUCIDS F. CARY, 
Assistant City Attorney. 
page 6 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, held the 22nd day 
of February, 1927. 
Amanda A. J ac.kson, plaintiff, 
against 
The City of R.ichmond, defendant. 
CASE. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys and there-
upon the defendant City filed its demurrer to the declara-
tion; whereupon the plaintiff moved the Court to allow her 
to amend the declaration by inserting the foil owing language : 
"And the plaintiff further says that she filed with the :City 
Atton1ey of the said City of Richmond 'vithin six months 
after the aforesaid cause of action accrued to her, written 
statements verified by her and her ag~nt and attorney, of the 
nature of her claims and of the time and place at which the 
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said injury is alleged to have occurred or been received and 
sustained by her by reason of the aforesaid negligence of the 
said City of Richmond.'' , 
And the Court allowed the declaration to be so amended 
and thereupon overruled the defendant's demurrer; to which 
rulings of the Court in allowing the declaration to be amended 
and in overruling the demurrer, the defendant excepted. 
The defendant then filed its demurrer to the amended 
declaration, in which the plaintiff joined and the Court over-
ruled the demurrer to the declaration as amended; to which 
ruling of the Court the defendant excepted. 
The defendant City thereupon filed its two written pleas 
to the declaration numbered Plea No. 1 and Plea No. 2 ; and 
the plaintiff filed its written motion to reject, strike out and 
dismiss the said two several pleas respectively, and likewise 
:filed her written demurrer to the said two several pleas, which 
motion to reject and strike out and which' said demurrer to 
the pleas the Court, after argument overruled. 
To which rulings of the Court in both respects the plaintiff 
excepted. 
page 7 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond 
Amanda Jackson 
v. 
City of Richmond. 
DEMURR.ER. 
The said defendant demurs to the plaintiff's declaration, 
because the same is not sufficient in law and for cause of de-
murrer says that the said declaration fails to allege that a 
'vritten statement, verified by the oath of the plaintiff, her 
agent or attorney of the nature of the claim and of the time 
and place at w·hich the injury is alleged to have occurred or 
been received, had been filed with the City Attorney of said 
defendant within six months after such alleged cause of ac-
tion accrued. 
CITY OF RJ.CH~IOND. 
By JAMES E. CANNON, 
City Attorney. 
32 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
page 8 ~ Virginia : 
In the La'Y and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
City of R.ichmond 
ads. 
Amanda Jackson. 
PLEA NO. 1 TO JURISDICTION. 
The said City of Richmond, by its attorney, comes and· says 
that the plaintiff ought not to have or maintain her action 
against the said City, beeause he says that said plaintiff has 
not filed with him prior to the commencement of said action, 
a written statement, verified by the oath of the claimant, her 
agent or attorney, of the nature of the clnim and the time 
and place at which the injury is alleged to have occurred or 
been received. Aud he further says that the only notice 
touehing said claim filed with him prior to the commencement 
of said action, ·was a certain notice dated April 28, 1H23, 
signed by B. A. Jackson, purporting to be the son of Amanda 
A. Jackson, which is now to the ~court here shown and made 
a part of this plea, which said notice the said City Attorney 
says was not given by the plaintiff, her agent or attorney 
and did not set forth the nature of the claim. And this the 
said City Attorney is ready to verify. 
Wherefore, the said City Attorney prays judgment if the. 
·said plaintiff ought to have or maintain her action against 
the said ·City of Richmond. 
iSta te of Virginia, 
CITY OF RIOH1\f0ND. 
By JA1\tiES E. CANNON, 
City Attorney. 
. City of Richmond, To-wit: 
I, Isabelle Eason, a Notary Public in· and for the City 
aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do certify that J a1nes 
R. Cannon, this day personally appeared before me in my 
City aforesaid and made oath that he is the City 
page 9 ~ Attorney of the City of Richmond and that the aver-
ments contained in the aforesaid plea are true. 
Amanda A. Jackson v. City of Richmond. 
Given under my hand this 24th day of 1\tfay, 1924. 
My commission expires July 17th, 1927. 
JSABELLE EASON, 
Notary Public. 
(Notice-part of plea) 
John Hirschberg 
Attorney and •Counsellor at Law 
Suite 203 ~Ioore Building 
Richmond, Va. · 
April 28, 1923. 







Please accept this as a notice of injury anfl damage to the. 
person of Amanda A. Jackson who resides 518 N. 22nd St., 
Richmond, Virginia, and who met with a serious accident, 
along with certain damages on the night of Wednesday, 25th 
day of April, 1923, between the hours of 9 and 10 P. M~ and 
at or near and between 22nd and 23rd Strets on leigh, on the 
south side walk and in or about the middle of the City 
block. · 
To the best of my information, from the hospital authori-
ties, (R.etreat for the Sick), has broken arm, hip bone broken 
and considerably bruised. 
Signed B. A .. T.\Ol(SON 
Son of Amanda A. Jackson. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, To-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me,. B. A. Jackson 
and made oath that the foreg':)ing statements are true to th~ 
best of his knowledge, information and belief. 
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Given under my hand this 28th day of ... 1\.pril, 1923. 
My commission expires January 26, 1925. 
page 10 ~ Virginia : 
RUTH H. BLANTON, 
Notary Public. 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
City of Richmond 
ads. 
~anda Jackson. 
PLEA NO. 2 TO JURISDICTION. 
The said City of Richmond, by its attorney, comes and says 
that the plaintiff ought not to have or maintain her action 
against the said City, because he says that the said plaintiff 
has not filed with him a sufficient written statemen, verified 
by the oath of herself, her agent or attorney of the place where 
the said injury is alleged to have occurred or been received. 
He further says that the only written notice served upon him 
within six months after the injury is alleged to have occurred 
(other than the said notice of B. A. Jackson :filed with this 
. defendant's plea No. 1) was a certain notice dated the 22nd 
day of September, 1923, purporting to be signed by the said 
~~manda A. Jackson, and now to the Court here shown and-
made a part of this plea, which said notice was served upon 
him after the institution of the said action and "rhich does 
uot sufficiently indicate the place where the said injury is 
alleged to have occurred or been received, w·hich said notice 
is not sufficient to give this Honorable 'Court jurisdiction in 
the premises. And this the said City .Attorney is ready to 
verify. 
Wherefore, the said City Attorney prays judgment if th_e 
said plaintiff ought to have or maintain her action against 
the said City of Richmond. 
CITY OF RICH~iOND. 
By JAI\iES E. CANNON, 
- City .Attorney. 
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State of Virginia, 
·City of Richmond, To-wit: 
I, Isabelle Eason, a Notary Public in and for the City 
aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do certify that 
·page 11 ~ Jamas E. Cannon, this day personally appeared 
b~fore. me in my City aforesaid and made oath that 
lie is the City Attorney of the City of Richmond and that the 
averments contained in the foregoing plea are true. 
Given under my hand this 26th day of ~'lay, 1924. 





In the La,v & Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Amanda A. Jackson, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
·City of Richmond. 
To the Honorable James E. Cannon, Attorney for the said 
City: 
You are hereby notified that on or about the 25th day of 
April, 1923, I sustained certain injuries and damages by rea-
son of the negligence of the ·City of Richmond, its officers, 
and agents, and officers' agents and its employees and others, · 
resulting from the dangerous and negligent \vay in which the 
,bricks had been allowed to be and become loose and scat-
tered about on the south side walk of Leigh S'treet, between 
the intersection of 22nd and 23rd streets. In carefully 'valk-
jug on the said sidewalk at night at this point, my foot 
alighted on one or more of the bricks and beenuse of the loose 
and unfirm condition, it or they turned and threw me down 
causing me to break my elbow and my hip bone and also to 
.suffer other very painful and permanent injuries, and my 
total damages aggregate the sum of $25,000.00. 
Witness my hand this 22 day of September, 1923. 
MRS. AMANDA A. JACKSON. 
36 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
,State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
page 12 ~ This day, personally appeared before me, 0. L . 
.Schweickert, a Notary Public, in and for the City 
aforesaid, Amanda A. Jackson, whose name is subscribed to 
the foregoing statement and who made oath before me 1hat 
the allegations therein made are true. · · 
Given under my hand this 22nd day of September, 1923. 
0. ;L. S'CH"\VEICKERT, 
Notary Public. 
My coiiUilission expires 2/24, 1926. 
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In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmqnd. 
·Amanda A. Jackson 
vs. 
·City of Richmond. 
~lOTION TO STRIKE OUT. 
The plaintiff comes and moves to reject, strike out and 
dismiss the two several pleas to the jurisdiction filed by· the 
defendant in this case upon the same ground set forth in 
plaintiff's written demurrer to said pleas which demurrer is 
made a part of this motion as if set out herein in haec verba, 
and because said pleas are made by an attorney and not an 
own proper person. 
See Davidson v. TifTatts, 111 Va. 394. 
Hortous v. Townes, 6 Leigh. 47. 
A1\1ANDA A. JACI{SON. 
By JOHN HIRSCHBERG, 
l\I. J. FULTON, 
Counsel. 
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In the La~ and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Amanda A. Jackson 
vs. 
City of Richmond. 
DEMURRER. 
The said plain tiff comes and demurs to the two several 
pleas to the jurisdiction of the Court filed by the defendant in 
this case and for the .grounds of her said demurrer says: 
1.. That the said pleas are insufficient in law. 
2. That they are too uncertain and indefinite for 1he Court 
to say whether or not the notice referred to thereiu was suf-
ficient or not; they admit filing of a written statement. 
Neither of said pleas contain any statement of fact 'vhich 
negatives the jurisdiction of the Court. 
4. The notice of motion shows on its face proper matter 
for the jurisdiction of the Court and the St~tute, Sec. 6105, 
provides that no exemption for want of jurisdiction be al-
lowed unless it be taken by plea in abatement, no such plead; 
iug or any other pleading shall be received." * * *' unless 
filed at the next rules. And the two pleas show on their face 
that they were not filed in this case at the rules next suc-
ceeding the rules at which the Notice of ~iotion was filed. 
5. The pleas sho'v on their face that they rlo not apply to 
the territorial jurisdiction of this court and the pleas are 
insufficient in that they fail to show that the court has not 
jurisdiction of the plaintiff or subject mattor. 
1lioore v. Norfolk Il. R. Co., 124 Va. 628, 635, 98 S .. E. 635. 
~- Each of said pleas show that the court has territorial 
and also jurisdiction of the subject matter referred to in 
the notice of motion and the and the matter attempted to be 
pleaded in the several pleas are not a bar to the cause o! ac~ 
tion. 
page 15 ~ 7. The two several pleas were each a plea in 
abatement and were not filed until after the de~ 
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fendant had demurred to the notice of motion and were there-
fore not receivable and should be stricken out. That the said 
plea1Fc.lo not allege that no written statement or that no suf-
ficient written statement verified by oath of the plaintiff, her 
agent or attorney of the nature of the claim and of the time 
and place at which the injury is alleged to have occurred or 
been received was not filed ·with the defendant city a.ttorney 
within six .months after the alleged cause of action accrued 
or the injury complained of was relie·ved or sustained by the 
plaintiff. 
This defendant therefore upon the demurrer prays the 
judgment of the Court as to whether she should be required 
to make any further answer. 
A.~IANDA A .. JACICSON. 
By JOI-IN HIRSCHBERG, 
l\L J. FlJLTON~ 
Counsel. 
page 16 ~ And at anotl1er day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richn1ond, the 8th day 
of April, 1927. 
This day came the plaintiff by counsel and filed herein her 
replications No. 1 and No. 2 to the pleas heretofore filed by 
the defendant. 
(REPLICATION NO. L) 
·virginia: 
_In the La.w and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Amanda A. J aekson 
vs. 
City of R-ichmond. 
Replication to Defendant's Pleas. 
The plaintiff comes and says that the defendant ought not 
to be permitted or allowed to plead the two several pleas by 
him above pleaded, because the plaintiff says: 
That within six months from the time the alleged cause 
of action complained of in the decalration a.:!crued or arose, 
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to-wit: on April 25th, 1923, the plaintiff did file with the Hon. 
James E. Cannon, defendant's City Attorney, the following 
two written statements, verified by the oath of the plaintiff, 
claimant, and her agent or attorney respectively, of the na-
ture of the elaim and of the time and place at which the in-
jury is alleged to have occurred or been received, one of which · 
written statements was in words and figures as follows: 





''April 28, 1923. 
Please accept this as a notice of injury and damage to the 
person of Amanda A. Jackson, who resides 518 N. 22nd 
~Street, Richmond, Virginia, and who met with a 
page 17 r :serious accident, along with certain damages on 
the night of Wednesday, 25th day of April, 1923, 
between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m., and at or near and be-
tween 22nd and 23rd streets on Leigh, on the south side-
walk and in or about the middle of the Citv block. 
To the best of my information, from the "hospital authori-
ties, (Retreat for the Sick) has a broken arm, hip bone broken 
and considerably bruised. 
(S'igned) B. A. JACJ{SON, 
Son of Amanda A. Jackson.'' 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me- B. A. Jackson, 
the son of Amanda A. Jackson, and made oath that the fore-
g·oing· statements are true to the best of his knowledge, in-
formation and belief. 
Given under my hand this 28th day of .. A.pril, 1923. 
R.UTfi I-I. BLANTON, 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires January 26th, 1925. '' 
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and plaintiff says that the said B. A. Jackson in filing said 
written statement was acting as her agent and made and 
filed same for her under oath; that later the said plaintiff, to-
wit: on September 25th, 1923, within six months of the time 
, the injury was received, also filed with the said Hon. James E. 
Cannon, Attorney for the defendant City of Richmond an-
other written statement, verified by the oath of the com-
plainant, of the nature of her claim and of thB time and place 
at which the injury is alleged to have occurred or been re-
ceived, which 'vritten statement was in words and figures as 
follows: · 
To Honorable James E. Cannon, Attorney for the said City: 
You are hereby notified that on or about the 25th day of 
... "-.pril, 1923, I sustained certain injuries and damages· by rea-
son of the negligence of the :City of Richmond, its officers, 
and agents, and officer's ag-ents and its employees and oth-
ers, resulting from the dang~rous and negligent way in which 
the bricks had been allowed to be and becorne loose and scat-
tered about on the south side walk of Leigh street, 
page 18 ~ between the intersection of 22nd and 23rd Streets. 
In carefully walking on the said sidewalk at night 
at this point, my foot alighted on one or more of the bricks 
and because of the loose and unfirm condition, it or they 
turned and threw me down causing me .to break my elbow 
any my hip bone, and .also causing me to break my elbow and 
my hip bone, and also to suffer very painful and permanent 
injuries and my total damages aggregate the sum of $25,-
000.00. 
Witness my hand this 22 day of September, 1923. 
(Signed) ~IRS'. A~IANDA A.. JACI(SON." 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
This day, personally appeared before me, 0. L. Schweick-
ert, a Notary Public, in and for the City aforesaid, Amanda 
A. ,Jackson, whose name is subscribed to the foreg·oing state-
ment and who made oath before me that the nllegations there-
in made are true. 
Given under my hand this 22nd day of September, 1923. 
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My commission expires 2/14, 1926. 
(Signed) 0. L. SCH,VEICI{ERT, 
Notary Public.'' 
"rhich notice was acknowledged by the City .A.ttorney in the 
manner following: 
' 'S'ept. 25, 1923. 
Received of Fulton & Wicker, attorneys for Amanda A. 
Jackson, statement of claim in-re Amanda A. Jackson vs. City 
of Richmond. 
(Signed) OFFICE OF CITY ATTORNEY, 
By R. B. Bl~OOKE.'' 
And that each and both of said written statements were 
!filed within .six souths of the time when such cause of action 
accrued to the plaintiff, and that the defeudant, after re-
ceiving said notices not only had ample opportunity to but 
did act upon suc.h written statements and notices and did in-
vestigate the claim, and inspect and repair the place where 
the accident occurred and fully investigated the cause of the 
action within said six months· from the time when the acci-
dent occurred. 
And this she prays may be inquired of by the country. 
A~IANDA A. J~~Cl{SON, 
By JOHN HIRRCHBERG 
. 1\ti. J. FULTON 
page 19 ~ (REPLICATION NO. 2.) 
Vi.rginia: 
In the La"r and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Amanda A. Jackson 
vs. 
City of Richmond. ,I 
42 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Replication No. 2. 
The said plaintiff, by her attorney, comes and says that 
said defendant ought not to have or be allowed to maintain 
the defense sought to be alleged in its two several pleas to 
the jurisdiction of the Court; because the plaintiff says that 
the cause of action alleged in the declaration arose and ac-
crued to the plaintiff on A.pril 25th, 1923, and that she in-
·stituted this suit to First September Rules 1923, and filed 
a declaration on September 17th, 1923, and that she did, "ith-
in six months after the cause of action is alleged in the 
declaration to have accrued to her, file with defendant's City 
Attorney, two 'vritten statements severally filed with defend-
ant's said two pleas, 'vhich written statements were verified 
by the oaths of the plaintiff and her agent or attorney re-
spectively and that each of them stated the nature of the 
claim and the time and place at which the injury is alleged 
to have occurred, and that defendant's said pleas are to the 
jurisdiction of the court and were filed after the defendant 
had demurred and after the rules next succeeding the rules 
at which the declaration was filed, and this the plaintiff is 
ready to verify. 
That in .the said written statement dated A.pril 28th, 1923, 
the plaintiff requested the said City Attorney to: 
''Please accept this as a notice of injury or damage to the 
person of Amanda .A.. J acksou. '' 
and that the defendant's said City Attorney received the said 
several "written statements" on April 28th, 1923, and Sep-
tember 25th, 1923, respectively within six months after the 
alleged cause of action acerued to the plaintiff and that neither 
he nor the defendant made any objection to the 
page 20 ~ said two several "written statements" or either 
of them and did not file its hvo ~ever a I pleas No. 
1 and 2 to the jurisdiction of the court, until long after the 
rules next succeeding the rules at which the declaration 'vas 
:filed and until long after the expiration or this six montl1s 
after the cause of action was alleged- to have accrued to the 
plaintiff, a.nd if the said defendant is now nllowed to make 
the defense set up in its two said several plP-as that it 'vould 
be inequitable and injurious and prejudicial to the plaintiff 
whose position by reason of the actions, silence and passive 
acquiescence of the said defendant in the suffieiency of said 
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"written statements", without objection thereto within the 
said six months period, changed for the worse. 
And of th~s the plaintiff puts herself upon the country. 
AMANDA A. JACI<SON, 
By JOHN HIRSCHBERG and 
M. J. FULTON 
page 21 }- And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond the 1st day 
of J nne, 1927. 
This day came the defendant by counsel and filed herein its 
Demurrer to plaintiff's replications and its motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's replcations numbered 1 and 2. 
Virginia: 
In the La'v & Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
DEl\iURRER TO PLAINTLFF'S REPLICATIONS. 
Amanda A. Jackson 
vs. 
City of Richmond. 
The said defendant demurs to the plaintiff's replications, 
:filed herein, and numbered 1 and 2, because the same are not 
sufficient in law, and for grounds of demurrer says: 
,J 
(1) That the plaintiff had the right to demur or reply to 
the defendant's two: pleas, but that she had no right to do 
both, and thnt the plaintiff having demurred to said defend-
ant's two pleas, which demurrer has been overruled by an 
order of this court, the plaintiff cannot file said replications, 
numbered 1 and 2, under the common law rule that a party 
is not allowed to demur and plead to the same matter, 'vhich 
common law rule still pr.evails in Virginia aR to a plaintiff. 
(2) That plaintiff's replication No. 1, sets out verbatim 
the same two insufficient charter notices filed in defendant's 
pleas Nos. 1 and 2, and that plaintiff's replication No. 2 does 
not traverse the said insufficient charter notices, and there-
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fore is to be taken as confessing the same as alleged in de-
fendant's pleas N as. 1 and 2. That no ne'v material facts 
are alleged in plaintiff's replications No. 1 and 2, and the 
issue presented thereby has already been adjudi-
page 22 ~ cated by the order of this court overruling the 
plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's said two pleas. 
(3) That said plaintiff's replications Nos. 1 and 2 show . 
and confess that the only two written statements filed by the 
plaintiff with the City Attorney 'vere, first, the ope filed April 
;28, 1923, which is insufficient in that it omits entirely that 
"nature" of the claim, and second, the one filed September 
25, 1923, which is insufficient in that it was filed after action 
was brought at first September rules 192R, and after the 
declaration was filed on September 17, 1923, and also does 
not identi.fy with any certainty the ''place'' of the accident. 
(4) That neither the receipt of said written statements nor 
an investigation based thereon operate as any waiver of 
the mandatory charter requirements of the City of Rich-
mond as to notice. That repairing a street cannot be con-
strued as an admission of negligence. Va., f?tc., fVheel Co. v. 
Chalkley, 98 V a. 62. 
(5) That said defendant's pleas Nos. 1 nnd 2 are not dila-
tory pleas, but set up the plaintiff's failure to perform man-
datory conditions precedent to the ri-ght to sue at all. 
CITY OF RICH~IOND. 
LUOJU,S F. CARY, 
Assistant City Attorney. 
Virginia: 
By Counsel. 
· In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Amanda A. Jackson 
vs. 
·City of Richmond 
The defendant comes and moves the Court to dismiss the 
plaintiff's replications filed herein, and nnmbered 1 and 2 
and for grounds of its motion to dismiss said repli-
page 23 ~ cations, the defendant states that the plaintiff had 
the right to demur or reply to defendant's two 
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pleas, but that she had no right to do both, and that the plain-
tiff having demurred to defendant's two pleas, which de-
murrer has been overruled by an order of this court, the 
plaintiff cannot file said replications, numbered 1 and 2, un-
der the common la'v rule that a party is not allowed to de-
mur and plead tt> the same matter, which common law rule 
still prevails in Virginia as to a plaintiff. 
'Vherefore, the defendant prays judgment, whether the 
plantiff ought to have or maintain her action aforesaid 
~gainst it. 
LUCIUS F. CAR.Y, 
Assistant City Attorney. 
CITY OF RICHl\iOND. 
By Counsel. 
page 24 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the 1City of Richmond, held the 
4th day of June, 1927. 
This day came again the parties by their attorneys, and 
the defendant filed a written plea of the statute of limitations 
to the declaration as amended on February 22nd, 1927. There-
upon defendant's mot on to reject and strike out the two spe-
cial replications of the plaintiff as also the demurrer to the 
said special replications were argued and submitted. And 
the court, being of the opinion that the said two replications 
should be taken as having been filed by leave of Court, the 
defendant's demurrer being withdrawn for that purpose, doth 
overrule defendant's motion to dismiss or strike out. 
And the Court, as to other matt~rs argued before it, now 
~Ues a written memorandum prepared at the conclusion of the 
argument, which is made a part of the record. 
page 25 } Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Amanda A. Jackson 
vs. 
City of llichmond. 
-----------------~-----
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PLEA OF STATUTE OF LI~IITATIONS. 
The defendant, by its attorney, comes ancl. says thai. the 
supposed cause of action in the Amended Declaration in this 
action mentioned, is founded upon a personnl injury tort and 
that the same did not acerue to the said pfaintiff after one 
year from the date of the accident, April 25, 1923, in the lnan-
ner and form as the said plaintiff hath cmnplained against 
it. 
CITY OF RTC!Ti\IOND. 
LlJCIUS F. CARY, 
Assistant City Attorney. 
page 26 ~ 
Amanda Jackson 
VB. 
City of Richmond. 
~IEl\fO. BY COURT. 
By Counsel. 
By the order entered on the :2:2nd day of Feb'y., 1927. the 
court allowed the plaintiff to amend her declaration by in-
serting a general allegation that notice had been given to the 
City Attorney in conformity with the charter provison, where-
upon the defendant demurred to the declaraton as amended, 
nnd the court overruled the demurrer; the defendant then 
filed two special pleas in writing, and the plaintiff first moved 
the court to strike out th~ two pleas, and then demurred to 
them, both of which positions of the plaintiff were denied 
or overruled. 
Since that time the plaintiff has filed written replications 
to each of the pleas, and the defendant has filed a motion to 
reject and strike out the replications, and likewise a demurrer 
to them. 
The questions arising upon tlw motion to strike out, and 
upon the demurrer to the pleas, have been arg-ued before me 
this June 4th, 1927. 
There are three cases so far in Virginia relntive to tho no-
tice of the claim to be g-iven to a municipal corporation in 
neg·Iigcnce cases. They are 0 'Neil vs. City of Richm,ond,. 141 
\T a. 1 ()8; Bowles vs. City of R'ichnwnd, 133 S. ]ij. 593, and City 
of Portsm,ou.th vs. Weiss, 145 Va. 94. I gather from these 
eases that the notice or statement filed 'vithin the prescribed 
period is in the nature of a condition precedent to the mainte-
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nance of the action, and therefore an omissi on to allege in 
the plaintiff's pleading that the law had been complied with 
in this respect renders the pleading subject to demurrer. 
The omission to so allege in the declaration or motion in this 
case hfts been cured by an amendment w·hich 
page 27 ~ the court properly allowed. The amendment, 
which merely alleges in general terms com-
pliance with · the charter requirements, does not of 
itself change the cause of action nor make a new case; it 
merely supplies one of the omitted requisites connected wtth 
hut essential to the plaintiff's case, which should have b~en 
averred in the orig:nial declaration. But the additional plead-
ings now before the court disclose that there was a statement 
:filed with City Attorney a few day.s after the occurrence com-
plained of, and some time before action 'vas brought; also that 
after the action was brought another independent statement 
was filed, this having been done within the six months, but 
some time before the declaration was amended. I think the 
statement :filed or prepared in April, 1923, and on which the 
plaintiff necessarily relied at the time the snit was brought, 
is manifestly insufficient and cannot support the allegation 
in the declaration. It is required that the plantiff should 
state the "nature of the claim", which is almost universally 
held to mean or include the character of the clefect complained 
of, however briefly or concisely it ma.y be described. The only 
description in this respect in the statement in effect is, that 
the plaintiff 'met with a·seriou.s acc·ident on f.lz.e sidewalk. In 
my opinion the plaintiff had no case at the time the original 
declaration was filed in the Clerk's Office on Sept. 17th, 1923. 
'J~he second statement, after institution of the action, was 
.filed ''rith the City Attorney on S'ept. 25th. 1923. The de-
fendant by his motion, and the demurrer to the replications, 
insists that this second statement was insufficient. To this 
it is opposed, on behalf ·of the plaintiff, that the second no-
tice was not only sufficient in itself but considered together 
with the first statement as embracing a complete statement 
to the City, it is not open to objection in any respect. In re-
ioinder to this position the City Attorney argues that the two 
statements are entirely independent and cannot be considered 
as embodying a single statement, and in addition 
page 28 ~ that no statement at aU can be filed, under the 
terms of the la.w, after the suit has been brought, 
althoug'h filed within the period pres~ribed by the charter, as 
'vas the case here. I am rather inclined to think that if an 
action is prematurely brought before the statement is filed, 
yet a statement properly filed in compliance 'vith law though 
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after institution of the action, can, under the Virginia prac-
tice, be brought into the case ·by an amended pleading; for 
it would appear needless technicality to compel the institu~ 
tion of a new action. But however this ~ay be, the situation 
'vhich has arisen here raises a question which goes to the very 
right to maintain the suit under the statute of limitations. 
The City has filed a plea of the statute to the amended 
declaration. This declaration only contains, as already stated, 
a general allegation ·of compliance with the la"T· The sub-
sequent pleadings or papers, however they may be styled, 
disclose that this second statement was filed with after the 
snit was brought, and that the declaration was amended so 
as to bring it in the case only after the period of limitation 
for institution of an action for negligence bud expired. Does 
the amendment make a new case, so that the iimitation period 
runs to the time of the filing of the amended pleading, and 
so this action is barred? Or does the amendment relate back 
to the original declaration t It is insisted that this cannot be 
correct because the statement in question was not in existence 
at the time the suit was brought,' and being a.n essential part 
of plaintiff's case, it could not be relied upon unless made 
part of a new case or an amendment equivalent to a new case. 
:'\Vhether I shall decide this question now on the admitted 
facts in the papers on record, or whether I shall direct all 
the pleas, replications, &c., to be stricken out as misplead-
ing, and decide the question on the trial, is a matter of inclif-
ference as there is no dispute beh\reen the parties as to the 
few facts necessary for a solution of the question. 
page 29 ~ I desire however to form my opinion upon this· 
necessarily vital question. 
In Burk's Pl. & Pr. (2nd Ed.), p. 392, the a-uthor says: 
"If the amendment sets up no new cause of action or claim, 
and makes no new demands, but simply varies and expands 
the original cause of action, the amendment relates back to 
the commencement of the action and stops tht~ running of the 
statute as of that date; but an amendment which introduces a 
new or different cause of action, or makes a new or different 
demand, does not relate back and the statute rontinues to run 
till date of amendment." 
In a note to this quotation several authorities are referred 
to, which may be examined by counsel. 
R.eference may be made to the following a] so: 
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Watson v. Bntnne1·, 128 Va. 600. 
Norfolk, etc., R. R. v. G1·eenwich Corp., 122 Va. 631. 
Irvine v. Barrett, 119 Va. 587. . 
Agee v. Virginian R'lw'y. Co., 126 S. E. 564. 
4 V a. Law Reg. 731, 8 Id. 430, 
and the notes to Code, Section 6104. 
Counsel should noti~y me whether they desire to argue this 
question, before I pass upon it. 
J uue 4, 1927. 
page 30 ~ Virginia: 
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City of Richmond .. 
The plaintiff by her attorney comes and says: that the 
cause of action mentioned in the declaration and amended 
declaration in the action mentioned is one and the same cause. 
of action and did accrue to the said plaintiff not only within 
one year from the date of the accident mentioned therein but 
within six montl1s from the date of the accident, to-wit: April 
25th, 1923, and. that she instituted this action to First Sep-
tember Rules, 1923, within six months after the cause of ac-
tion mentioned in the declaration and a.mended declaration 
accrued to her; and that ·within six months f1·om the time the 
alleged cause of action complained of in th~ declaration ac-
:crued or arose, to-wit: on April 25th, 1923, that the plaintiff 
did file with the I-Ionorable James E. Cannon, defendant's· 
City Attorney, the following two written statements verified 
by the .oath of the plaintiff, claimant, and her agent or at-
torney respectively, of the nature of the claim and of the· 
time and place at which the injury is alleged to have oc-
curred or been received, one of whieh verified written state-
ments was in words and figures as follows: 
•. 
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. Please accept this as a. notice of injury and damage to the 
person of Amanda A. Jackson who re'sides 518 N. 22nd S't., 
Richmond, Virginia, and who met with a Rerious accident, 
along 'vith certain damages on the night of Wednesday, 25th 
day of April, 1923, behveen the hours of 9 and 10 P. M. and 
at or near and behveen 22nd and 23rd Streets on Leigh, on 
the south side walk and in or about the middle of the City 
block. 
page 31 ~ To the best of my information, from the hos-
pital authorities, (Retreat for the Sick) has a 
~broken arm, hip bone broken and considerably bruised. 
"State of Virginia, 
(Signed) B. A. ~JACI\:SON, 
Son of Amanda Jackson.'' 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, B. A. Jackson, 
the son of Amanda A. Jackson, and made oath that the fore-
·lg<}ing statements are true to the best of his knowledge, in-
formation and belief. 
Given under my hand this 28th day of April, 1923. 
R.UTH fi. BLANTON, 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires .J.anuary 26th, 1925." 
and plaintiff says that the said B. A .• Jackson in filing said 
written statement was acting as her agent and made and filed 
same for her under oath; that immediately after re<}eipt of 
this notice the said defendant acted upon the same and vis-
ited and inspected the place where the accident occurred and 
did fully investigate the claim and the cause of action men-
tioned in the declaration and amended declaration within 
said six months from the time the accident occurred and be-
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fore this action was instituted; and, that on May 31st, 1923, 
the plaintiff, by her attorneys wrote and delivered to Hon-
orable James E. Cannon, defendant's City Attorney, a let-
ter in which she by her attorneys again set forth the nature 
of her claim and the time and place of the injury mentioned 
in this action, and which letter is in 'vords and figures as 
follows: 
Ron. J as. Cannon, 
City Attorney, 
City. 
Dear Senator : 
'' lVIay 31, 1923. 
In re: Jackson vs. City of R~chmond. 
We are writing you relative to the matter of Amanda 
Jackson vs. City of R.ichmond. 1\1:rs. Jackson has employed 
us together 'vith Hon. John Hirschberg to :represent her in 
the collection of a claim against the City for dam-
page 32 ~ ages resulting from a fall caused by loose bricks 
and broken~and uneven pavement on the south side 
of Leigh S'treet beh\reen 22nd and 23rd streets, on the night 
of .A.pril 25, 1923. 
1\tirs. Jackson is a woman of advanced years and fell by 
reason of the dangerous and unsafe condition of the pave-
ment and broke her left elbow .and left hip bone and injured 
her ankle and sustained other bruises, injuries and wounds. 
V\7 e are advised that report was made of this claim to the 
City by lvir. Hirschberg and we assume that you are familiar 
with the f.acts. 
We are writing you direct about the matter as we know 
this claim will be referred to you, and we shall be pleased 
to have you advise us what settlement, if any, the City will 
make. vV e will be pleased to confer with yon about the facts 
if you desire us to do so. 
Yours Yery truly, 
E/T'' FULTON & \VICT{ER, Attys. 
and the defendant on July, 1923, acknowledged receipt of this 
letter. 
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And that on September 17th, 1923, the said plaintiff by her 
attorneys also delivered to Honorable James E. Cannon, 
City Attorney, an exact copy of the original declaration filed 
in this cause of action which original declaration is here re-
ferred to and made a part of this plea as if set out in totide1n 
verbis; and, that the plaintiff, to-wit: on September 25th, 
1923, within six months of the time the injnr.y was received, 
also filed with the said I:Ionorable James E. Cannon, City 
Attorney, for the defendant ·City of Richmond, another writ-
ten statement verified by the oath of the complainant, of the 
nature of her claim and of the time and place at which the 
injury is alleged to have occurred or been received which 
written statement was· in words and figures as follows: 
To Honorable James E. Cannon, Attorney for the said City: 
You are hereby notified that on or about the 25th day of 
April, 1923, I sustained cert·ain injuries and damages by rea-
. son of the neg-ligence of the City of Richmo11d, its officers, 
and agents, and officers' agents and ts employees and others, 
resulting from the dangerous and negligent way in which 
the bricks had been allowed to be and become 
page 33 ~ loose and scattered about on the south side walk 
of Leigh Street, between the intersection of 22nd 
and 23rd Streets. In carefully walking on. the said sidewalk 
at night at this point, my foot alighted on one or more of the 
·bricks and because of the loose and unfirm condition, it or 
they turned and threw me down causng me to break my elhow 
and my hip bone, and also causing me to hreak my elbow 
and my hip bone, and also to suffer very painful and perma-
nent injuries and my total damages aggregate the sum of 
$25,000.00. . 
Witness my hand this 22 day of September, 1923. 
(Signed) ~·iRS. A~fA.NDA A .. JACKSON." 
State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
This day, personally appeared before· me, D. L. Schweick-
ert, a Notary Public, in and for the City aforesaid, Amanda 
A. Jackson, whose name is subscribed to the foregoing state-· 
ment and who made oath before me that the allegations there-
in made are true. 
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Given under my.hand this 22nd day of September, 1923. 
(Signed) 0. L. SCH\VEICICERT, 
Notary Public. 
1\{y commission expires 2/14, 1926. 
Which notice was acknowledged by the City Attorney in· 
the manner following: 
S'ept. 25, 1923. 
Received of Fulton & Wicker, attorneys for Amanda A. 
Jackson, statement of claim in-re Amanda A. ,Jackson vs. City 
of Richmond. 
(Signe4) OFFICE OF CITY ATTORNE.Y. 
By R. B. BR.OOKE." 
And the plaintiff says that each and both of the aforesaid 
verified written sta tern en ts and letter and eopy of declara-
tion were filed with the defendant as aforesaid 'vithin six 
mouths from the time when this cause of action accrued to 
the plaintiff and referred to the same cause of action, acci-
dent and injury and time and place and 'vere supplemental 
to each other, and that the defendant shortly after it received 
said first verified notices, did "rithin six mm1ths after this 
reause of action accrued, act upon said verified wrtten state-
ments and notices and did visit, inspect and repair the place 
w·here the accident oecurred, and also did aet upon each and 
all of said statements and .notices and fully investigated the 
said claim, its nature and cause of action within six months 
from the time the accident occurred and the said 
page 34 ~ cause of action accrued, and before the institution 
of this action. 
And this she prays may he inquired. of by the country. 
A~IAND.A. A. ,JAC.l{SON 
By 1\L J. FULTON, 
JOHN HIRSCHBERG, 
Counsel. 
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In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Amanda Jackson 
vs. 
·City of Richmond. 
DEl\t£URRER OF THE DEFENDANT TO THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REPLICATION TO DEFENDANT'S PLEA 
OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The said defendant says that the replication of the plain-
tiff to the defendant's plea of the statute of limitations is not 
sufficient in law, and states the grounds of demurrer relied 
on to be as follows: 
1. That the declaration, as appears from the record, was 
.amended by alleging in general terms that the requiren1ents 
of the defendant's charter had been complied with, and that 
said amendment was made after the statute of limitations 
had expired. 
2. That tl1e replication to defendant's plea of the statute 
of limitations, shows that the verified notice dated April 28, 
l 923, (the only notice filed prior to the bringing of the ac-
tion) was insufficient in that it did not set forth the "nature" 
of the claim, and cannot support the general a1legations 1nade 
in the amended declartaion. 
3. That, therefore, the plaintiff had no cause at the time 
the original declaration was filed in the clerk's office at the 
tfirst September rules. 
4. That the verified notice filed with the City 1\.ttorney on 
September 25, 1923, after the bringing of the action, was a 
new or different demand introduced under the amendment 
to the declaration made after the statute of limitations had 
expired, and that an amendment which introduces a new or 
different demand does not relate back, and the statute con-
tinued to run till the date of that amendment. 
5. That the letter of plaintiff's counsel dated 1\fay 31, 1.925, 
was an insufficient notice, as verification of :1 notice is a con-
dition precedent, and that an examination into the facts con-
stitutes no ·waiver of the required notice. 
LUCIUS F. CARY, 
Assistant City Attorney. 
CITY OF RICH1\1:0ND. 
By Counsel. 
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Amanda Jackson 
v. 
City of Richmond. 
MEMO. BY· COURT. 
Since tl1e conclusions of the court stated in a memorandum-. 
:filed on June 4th, 1927, the plaintiff files a replication to the fi 
defendant's plea of the statute of limitations to the amended 
declaration. Disregarding what may be taken as surplusage 
in the replication, it has the effect of alleging on the record 
that the amendment of the original declaration in Fehruary, 
1927, as t@ filing of notices of the c.Iaim was based upon the 
notice filed with the ~City A.ttorney on the 25th day of Sep-
tember, 1923, set out in the replication and to be taken· as 
set out in the plaintiff's amended declaration. To this repli-
cation the defendant City demurs. The question is thus raised 
-pointed out in the former memorandum of the court-
'vhether under the plea of the statute the limitation continues 
to run up to the time the declaration was amended, and there-
fore the action is barred. 
Referring to the section of the charter of the City in ques-
tion the Court says in the 0 'Neil case at p. 176 of 141 V a.: 
''The language here under review is so clear as to carry itEl 
own obvious meaning; indeed it is difficult if not impossible 
to express the purpose to prohibit the instHution or main-
tenance of any action whatever against the City based upon 
negligence, except after such notice. For tl1is court to put 
any limitation upon this clear and comprehensive language 
'vould be to defeat the purpose so clearly stated in the title 
as 'veil as in the text.'' 
lJpou consideration of the authorities mentioned in the 
former memo. of the Court, and of additional cases cited in 
argument by counsel on both sides, I am con-
page 37 ~ strained to the conclusion that the giving of the 
notice of claim subsequent to the institution of the 
action and the filing of an amended declaration upon such 
notice is equivalent to the bringing of a ne·w action at the 
time the amended declaration was filed and the limitation 
period runs up to that time. The plaintiff had no right of 
action until she gave notice; the notice having been given 
after the suit was brought and declaration filed, she could 
only be in position to insist upon her right to maintain a suit 
upon her cause of action from the time she files an amended 
declaration bringing in the notice required by the statute, 
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unless she lets her original declaration be dismissed on de-
murrer, or takes a non-suit upon the trial, and then brings 
a ne'v action. 
The amended declaration may not allege a technically ue'v 
cause of actio~, but it is based essentially upon a new claim 
or demand, without which no right of action against the de-
fendant existed upon the record at any time. The effect of 
an amended declaration of this character has not been be-
fore the court in Virginia, but in an Illinois case, referred 
to in argument, it was held that in general when a declaration 
oniits an averment of the required giving of notice an amend-
ment, after the limitation period has expired, is open to the 
plea of the statute. Edntunds v. Chica,qo, 203 Ill. App. 327. 
As the demurrer here goes to whole merits of the case, and 
is ilecessarily conclusive of the right of recovery, final judg-
ment may be entered upon the demurrer for the defendant, 
as was done in the case of lVl orrls v. TiJlhite, 146 Va. 553, and 
in the cases there mentioned at p. 573. · 
B. T. C. 
July 13, 1927. 
page 38 ~ And at another day, to-wit: ·At a Law and 
Equity Court of the ·City of Ricl1mond, the 28th 
day of July, 1927. · 
This day came the parties by their attorneys and the plain-
tiff filed a special replication to the defendant 's· plea of the 
statute of limitations, filed June 4th, 1927. To this replica-
tion the defendant then filed its demurrer in writing assign-
ing its reasons for the demurrer in which dmnurrer the plain-
tiff joined. The said demurrer to the replication being there-
upon argued before the Court, the Court is of the opinion 
for reasons stated in writing and made a part of the record 
that the said demurrer should be sustained. And it appear-
ing from the record and proceedings that this ruling of the 
:court carries with it necessarily a conclusion that the plain-
tiff's rig-ht of action is barred by the statute of limitations'-
.and, therefore, as the sustaining of the demurrer goes to 
the merits of the case, it is ordered that the demurrer of the 
defendant to the replication of the plaintiff to the plea of 
the statute of limitations filed by the defend::1nt to the plain-
tiff's amended declaration is sustained; and that the plaintiff 
take nothing by his bill and go thereof without day and the 
defendant recover of the plaintiff his costs about his defense 
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in this case expended; to which ruling and judgment of the 
Court the plaintiff at once excepted. 
Upon the suggestion by the plaintiff that she desires to 
apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ 
of error, it is ordered that the said judgment be suspended 
for a period of ~inety days from the elate hereof in the event 
the plaintiff or some one for her shall enter into bond within 
difteen days from this date before the Clerk of this Court with 
sufficient surety in the penal sum of Two Hundred Dollars 
($200.00) conditioned according to law; with leave to plain-
tiff to file proper bills or certificates of 'exception within sixty 
days from this date as prescribed by law. 
page 39 } And now at this day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of· Richmond, the 16th 
day of September, 1927. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys and the 
11laintiff tendered to the Court her Bill of Exception, and on 
the request of the said plaintiff the said Bill of Exception 
is signed, sealed and made a part of the record. 
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Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Amanda Jackson 
vs. 
City of R-ichmond. 
Be it remembered tl1at upon the hearing of the demurrer 
to the plaintiff's replication to the defendant's plea of the 
Statute of Limitatio11s filed in this cause, the Court sustained 
the demurrer to the plaintiff's replication, and no further 
replication being offered held that the plaintiffts right of 
action "ras barred by the Statute of Limitations and dis-
missed the action and entered final judgment for the defend-
ant, to which rulings and actions of the Court the plaintiff 
by counsel excepts and tenders this her Bill of Exception and 
prays that same may be signed, sealed and made a part of 
the record which is accordingly done this 16th day of Sep-
tember, 1927, within the time prescribed by law for the filing 
58 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
of· Bills of Exc.eptions ~and after due notice in writng to conn-· 
sel for defendant. 
BEVERLEY T. CRUJ\.IP, Judge. (Seal) 
page 41 ~ I, Luther Libby, Clerk of the Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, do hereby certify 
that the foregoing is a true transcript of the record in the 
above entitled action wherein Amanda A. tl ackson is plain-
tiff and the City of Richmond defendant, and that the de-
fendant had due notice of the intention of the plaintiff to ap-
ply for such transcript. 
Given under my h_and this 27th day of October, 1927. 
LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk. 
Fee for record, $17.00. 
A Copy-Teste: 
H. STEvV.A.RT JONES, C. C. 
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